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Section 5041 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19732 broadly declares a princi-
1. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979). The original text of § 504, as passed in 1973,
provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his for her] handicap, be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id., amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Development Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982.
29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976) defines "handicapped individual," in part, as "any person who
(A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as
having such an impairment." Id. § 706(6).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also requires affirmative action in the employment and ad-
vancement of qualified handicapped individuals in federal agencies, and by federal contractors
with contracts exceeding $2500. Id. § 793.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 represented an overhauling of the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act. In. 1920, Congress enacted the first rehabilitation act for civilians, the National Civilian
Rehabilitation (Smith-Fess) Act, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41 Stat. 735 (1920) (repealed 1973).
Under the Smith-Fess Act, the federal and state governments shared the cost of rehabilitation
services. The federal government contributed only to vocational programs for those handicap-
ped people able to be rehabilitated. In 1943, services were extended under the Act to the men-
tally ill and the retarded. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, Pub. L. No.
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pie of nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap under federal grants.3 In
fashioning section 504, Congress did not consider the uniqueness of the
discrimination the handicapped faced. Unlike racial or gender-based
discrimination, the remedying of handicap discrimination might necessitate
the expenditure of considerable sums of money to render work facilities ac-
cessible or to otherwise accommodate a handicapped individual. Despite the
possibility of requiring large expenditures, Congress did not expressly define
or delimit the scope of section 504, nor did it consider the potentially far-
reaching effects that provision would have on recipients of federal financial
assistance. One set of recipients that receives a small amount of federal aid,
and for which application of section 504 poses serious first amendment
questions, is church-related schools. This article discusses the application of
the section 504 mandate of nondiscrimination in employment4 to church-
related schools and how statutory construction and the first amendment
may limit that application.
I. SECTION 504 AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A PROBLEM OF
DEFINITION AND SCOPE
The Statute and Legislative History
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides, in pertinent part:
78-113, 57 Stat. 374 (repealed 1973). Under the 1954 Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amend-
ments, the federal government for the first time shared all expenses under state rehabilitation
plans. Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-565, 68 Stat. 652
(repealed 1973). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 continues to provide for sharing of the ex-
penses of state rehabilitation programs between the federal government and the state, while ex-
tending the programs and services available to the handicapped through special funding of pro-
jects, research, and training. See S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1973]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2079. Amendments to the 1973 Act have extended pro-
grams and services to handicapped individuals who may not be capable of vocational rehabili-
tation. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617. See S.
REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6373, 6388.
3. Before Congress acted to guarantee the federal civil rights of the handicapped through
§ 504, federal courts had begun to recognize the rights of handicapped individuals in educa-
tion. In 1972, a Pennsylvania district court acknowledged that the retarded had a constitutional
right pursuant to the fourteenth amendment equal protection and due process clauses to receive
as much education and training as the state afforded to others. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retard-
ed Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge panel), modifying
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.) (consent decree entered-on due process and equal protection
claims). Other federal courts had arrived at similar conclusions. See, e.g., New York Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Harrison v. Michigan,
350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 886 (D.D.C.
1972).
4. Section 504 was intended to prohibit recipients of federal assistance from discriminating
on the basis of handicap not only in employment, but also in housing, transportation, educa-
tional services, and health services. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388.
1981]
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No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States...
shall, solely by reason of his [or her] handicap, be excluded from the par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency .... I
The language of the provision does not specify that discrimination on the
basis of handicap in employment is prohibited. Rather, the mandate, in
simply outlawing discrimination on the basis of handicap, is broad and ap-
pears to be all-inclusive. The congressional statement of purpose, as well as
contemporaneous and subsequent legislative history, demonstrate that Con-
gress intended "discrimination" to include employment discrimination.
The declaration of congressional purpose provides that the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 is to 'promote and expand employment opportunities in the
public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such in-
dividuals in employment." ' 6 An examination of the legislative history of sec-
tion 504 prior to the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 further
demonstrates that Congress, or at least some of its members, intended
"discrimination" to include employment discrimination. In 1971, Repre-
sentative Charles A. Vanik introduced a bill to amend the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of physical or mental han-
dicap in programs receiving federal financial assistance.' Senators Hubert
H. Humphrey and Charles A. Percy introduced companion bills to the
Vanik Amendment in the Senate in 1972.8 The Humphrey-Percy bills sought
to amend Title VP and Title VII' 0 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to in-
clude prohibitions of discrimination against the handicapped. The bills were
5. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. I 1979). The original text of § 504, as passed in 1973,
see note 1 supra, was amended by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Develop-
ment Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976). The congressional declaration of purpose in § 701(8) may be
considered as directed specifically to §§ 791(b) and 793, the affirmative action provisions of the
Act, see note 1 supra and note 14 infra. However, when construed with Senator Humphrey's
statement, see text accompanying note 16 infra, and the finding of S. REP. No. 318, 93d
Cong.,.Ist Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 119731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, see note 17 and
accompanying text infra, the § 701(8) declaration of purpose lends support to the interpreta-
tion of § 504 as a ban on employment discrimination on the basis of handicap under federally
assisted programs and activities.
7. H.R. 13306, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 5059 (1972); H.R. 13009, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 2968 (1972); H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG.
REC. 45945 (1971). Sixty members of the House and 20 members of the Senate cosponsored
the Civil Rights Bill. See 119 CONG. REC. 7114 (1973) (statement by Rep. Vanik).
8. S. 3458, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 11788 (1972); S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 525 (1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). Title VI prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin under programs receiving federal financial assistance.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). Title VII includes a broad ban on
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
Title VII is applicable to employers of a certain size in an industry affecting commerce,
regardless of whether the employer receives federal assistance.
[Vol. 31:69
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not reported out of the House or Senate Judiciary Committees." Rather, a
provision similar to the proposed amendments to the Civil Rights Act was
included in the proposed Rehabilitation Act of 1972 when the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare considered the bill.' 2 This provision
became section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which became law
after presidential vetoes of two previous bills containing the same
provision. I
In the course of the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, there was
very little discussion of section 504 of that Act. The limited discussion,
however, suggests that section 504 was intended to prohibit employment
discrimination under federally assisted programs. In a statement in support
of the Senate version of the proposed Rehabilitation Act of 1972, Senator
Humphrey applauded the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
for including sections 5031' and 504 in the proposed Act. Senator Hum-
phrey stated that these provisions carry through the intent of the original
1972 bills'5 that he had introduced to "guarantee the right of persons with a
mental or physical handicap to participate in programs receiving Federal
financial assistance, and to make discrimination in employment because of
these handicaps, in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification,
an unlawful employment practice."'' 6 To the same effect, the Senate Report
accompanying the Senate version of what became the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 stated that the hearings on the Rehabilitation Act revealed that
employment discrimination was an area characterized by a lack of action,
and that this bill would fill the void.'" Thus, the legislative history
preceding the passage of section 504 indicates a congressional intent to in-
11. See 119 CONG. REC. 7114 (1973) (statement by Rep. Vanik).
12. The provision that ultimately became § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was not
included in the original House version of the proposed Rehabilitation Act of 1972, H.R. 8395,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 8965 (1972). The provision first appeared in the Senate
version of the proposed Rehabilitation Act of 1972, S. 3987, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG.
REC. 30675 (1972). The provision appears to have been added to H.R. 8395 while the proposed
Rehabilitation Act of 1972 was in the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. See 119
CONG. REC. 7114 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Vanik).
13. The proposed Rehabilitation Act of 1972, H.R. 8395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG.
REC. 8965 (1972), was pocket vetoed by then President Nixon, who claimed the bill was too
costly and wasteful of taxpayers' dollars. S. REp. No. 48, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted
in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2086-87. In 1973, Congress passed a bill similar to
H.R. 8395 of the previous Congress. S. 7, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 8056 (1973).
President Nixon vetoed the bill, again citing financial concerns as the motivation for his deci-
sion. S. Doc. No. 10, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [19731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2088.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). Section 503 requires that federal government
contractors take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity for the handicap-
ped.
15. See note 8 supra.
16. 118 CONG. REc. 32310 (1972).
17. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2076, 2078-79.
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clude employment discrimination in its general prohibition of discrimination
against the handicapped under federally assisted programs.
Subsequent legislative history also demonstrates this intent.'8 The Senate
Report accompanying the final bill amending the Rehabilitation Act stated:
"[S]ection 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicap-
ped individuals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from,
vocational rehabilitation services, in relation to Federal assistance in
employment, housing, transportation, education, health services, or any
other Federally-aided programs."' 9
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare-since renamed the
Department of Health and Human Services-also has interpreted section
504 and its sparse legislation as prohibiting discrimination against the handi-
capped in employment. HEW promulgated regulations implementing section
504 in 1977, nearly two and one-half years after section 504 became law."
When asked to explain the delay in the promulgation of implementing
regulations, representatives of HEW cited the sparse and unilluminating
legislative history surrounding section 504 and the uniqueness of the prob-
lem of discrimination against the handicapped, in comparison to discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex or race." The final regulations specifically prohibit
18. In discussing § 504 and congressional intent, courts have resorted to consulting subse-
quent legislative history to fill the void left by sparse statutory language and unilluminating
prior legislative history. Several courts have cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 380-81 (1969), for the proposition that subsequent legislative history has cogent
significance in construing a statute. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277
(7th Cir. 1977); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978).
Indeed, it was on the basis of the legislative history surrounding the 1974 amendments that one
federal district court ordered HEW to promulgate § 504 regulations. Cherry v. Mathews, 419
F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976).
19. S. REp. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6388.
20. Section 504, by its terms, did not provide for the issuance of regulations nor did it
authorize an enforcement scheme. Congress indicated, however, that it intended that regula-
tions be promulgated to implement § 504. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 39-40,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390-91. HEW did not begin drafting
the regulations until President Ford issued Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 17 (1977),
reprinted in 29 U.S.C. app. § 794 (1976), and until a federal district court ordered HEW to
issue them with no further delay. Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976).
21. In response to inquiry into the delay in promulgating regulations, HEW printed the
following explanation:
The process of preparing the proposed regulation for Section 504 has been time
consuming for a number of reasons. The issues inherent in discrimination on the
basis of handicap are new and complex. . . . The problem of determining the scope
and nature of what constitutes discrimination against handicapped persons has
been made more difficult by the sparseness of legislative history for Section 504.
Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs, 1976: Hearings on the Implementation of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1976). In a statement made at hearings
on the implementation of § 504, the Director of the HEW Office for Civil Rights stated that:
"[Tlhe development of the regulations was difficult because of the absence of substantive
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handicap discrimination in employment under programs and activities
receiving federal financial assistance.22
Although the discussion above establishes that section 504 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of handicap in employment under programs and
activities receiving federal financial assistance,23  a question remains
unanswered. Specifically, what did Congress mean by "program or
activity" in its prohibition of discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance under section 504? No clear definition
of "program" or "activity" is evident from the language of section 504 or
from the Act's legislative history. As noted by one commentator,
"[C]ongress seems to have glossed over the problem of defining 'program'
in their haste to read [sic] the crucial issue of discrimination. '2 4
legislative history; Section 504 was enacted without congressional hearings and with virtually
no floor debate in either body of Congress. Furthermore ...many forms of discrimination
are unique to the handicapped." Implementation of § 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (1977) (statement of David Tatel).
The confusion over congressional intent and implementation of § 504 was so great that
HEW Secretary Mathews refused to sign the proposed regulations before leaving office. The
next Secretary of HEW, Joseph Califano, ordered more extensive consideration of the regula-
tions before issuing them. Each Secretary, at some point in his tenure of office, wrote a letter
to Congress expressing his frustration at the lack of clear congressional intention. Letter from
Secretary Mathews to Congress (Jan. 18, 1977) and letter from Secretary Califano to Congress
(April 18, 1977), reprinted in Implementation of § 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 73, 76 (1977).
22. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-.14 (1981). Section 84.1 l(a)(l) provides: "No qualified handicapped
person shall, on the basis of handicap, be subjected to discrimination in employment under
any program or activity to which this part applies." The regulations apply to institutions
receiving or benefiting from federal financial assistance. Id. § 84.2.
23. Other federal laws and regulations restrict or prohibit discrimination in employment.
Under the Education Amendments of 1972, HEW promulgated regulations which included a
ban on discrimination in employment in education programs or activities. 45 C.F.R. §§
86.51-.61 (1980). The Supreme Court recently upheld the promulgation of these regulations
and concluded that HEW did not act beyond the scope of its authority in banning employment
discrimination under Title IX. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 50 U.S.L.W. 4501 (May 17,
1982).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally assisted programs or
activities where the primary objective of the assistance is to provide employment. 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-3. See text accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
The limited scope of Title VI, relating only to federally assisted employment, is sensible in
light of the existence of Title VII, which broadly bans employment discrimination regardless of
receipt of federal assistance. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 708-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Title VI, in essence, provides an additional remedy for disal-
lowance of federal assistance where the employer discriminates in its federally assisted employ-
ment program or activity. Title VII governs employment decisions made by employers of a cer-
tain size in an industry affecting commerce, employment agencies, and labor organizations. Id.
§§ 2000e, 2000e-2. It should be noted that Title VII does not prohibit employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of handicap.
24. Friedman, Administrative Cutoff of Federal Funding Under Title VI: A Proposed In-
terpretation of "Program," 52 IND. L.J. 651, 656 (1977).
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Three possible definitions of "program or activity" under section 504 are
discernible from the statute, the regulations, and relevant case law. Under
the first definition, section 504 mandates that recipients of federal
assistance not discriminate on the basis of handicap in employment generally.
"Program or activity" under this definition broadly refers to all of a recip-
ient's programs and activities. The second definition strictly limits the sec-
tion 504 prohibition of discrimination to those specific programs and ac-
tivities actually receiving federal financial assistance. Under the third possi-
ble definition, section 504 would prohibit discrimination only when the
primary objective of the federally assisted program or activity is to provide
employment. The last definition interprets "program or activity" most nar-
rowly. Each definition concerning the scope of the section 504 ban on
employment discrimination would have a different impact on the extent to
which church-related schools, and other employers, would need to alter
their employment practices. These definitions are discussed and evaluated in
the following paragraphs, and their impact is-explored in Part Two of this
Article.
The Scope of the Section 504
Ban on Employment Discrimination
Definition One: A Broad Ban of Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap
in Employment
Since the enactment of section 504 in 1973, individuals have brought a
number of cases 5 claiming discrimination on the basis of handicap in
25. A private right of action under § 504 for handicapped persons who claim to have been
discriminated against has been recognized in a number of cases. The seminal case in this line is
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (private right of action for
mobility disabled). See United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977)
(private right of action for mobility disabled); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir.
1977) (private right of action for student with vision in only one eye); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F.
Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (private right of action for individual with past history of drug
abuse who was in a methadone program); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635
(D.S.C. 1977) (private right of action for deaf teacher in need of interpreter for a refresher
course); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (private right of action for
blind teacher), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
Some courts have required that a plaintiff claiming a § 504 violation must first exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies. See, e.g., Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (com-
plaint dismissed without prejudice); Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (plaintiff must resort to administrative remedies before seeking temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (proceedings stayed pending administrative review). Other courts, however,
have maintained § 504 claims without requiring prior resort to administrative hearings when
"time is of the essence," e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466
F. Supp. 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (when time is of the essence in ensuring that mentally retarded
children are provided adequate education programs, it is unnecessary to defer to administrative
enforcement of the statute as otherwise might be required), and when there has been no mean-
ingful enforcement of § 504, e.g., Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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employment in violation of section 504.26 A number of courts appear to ap-
ply the section 504 mandate to the employment practices of the recipient
without limitation.27 Such application, in essence, equates "program" with
"recipient." These cases lend support to the view that section 504 regulates
all of a recipient's employment decisions, and that "program" under sec-
tion 504 includes all of a recipient's programs and activities.28 In only two
of these cases, however, did the majority opinion even cursorily discuss the
problem of defining the scope of section 504.9 The remainder of the courts
did not address the issue.
An examination of the nature of the recipients of federal financial
assistance in these cases may provide an explanation for the absence of
discussion regarding which programs and activities are subject to the section
504 nondiscrimination mandate. Almost all of these cases3" concerned a
recipient that was heavily, if not entirely, publicly financed, such as a
26. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980) (former employee of
federal contractor brought suit alleging handicapped based discrimination); Trageser v. Libbie
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978) (nurse sought reinstatement after being
discharged because of deteriorating eyesight), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979); Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (blind teacher brought action against officials of school
district alleging that she had been discriminated against because she was blind), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 923 (1981); Simon v. St. Louis County, 497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(paraplegic police officer who was discharged alleged that police department's failure to rehire
him violated his rights under Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F.
Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (applicant who was denied employment because of childhood
history of epilepsy brought action alleging violation of rights under Rehabilitation Act of
1973); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (epileptic
brought an action alleging she was denied position at hospital solely because of her epilepsy).
27. See, e.g., Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980);
Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979). But see cases discussed in
notes 57-74 and accompanying text infra. See also cases discussed in notes 36-56 and accompa-
nying text infra.
28. A board member of the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities stated: "[T]he
way I read section 504 it says that anybody who gets special monies is not supposed to
discriminate against handicapped people." Joint Oversight Hearings on Proposed Extensions
of the Rehabilitation Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the Comm. on
Educ. and Labor of the House of Representatives and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of
the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (Dec. 9, 10,
1975) (statement by Roger Peterson).
29. The court in Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979), specifically
rejected the defendant's argument that § 504 applied only to those programs and activities that
receive federal funds with the primary objective to provide employment. Similarly, the court in
Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980), refused to limit § 504's
mandate to the specific program or activities that receive aid. Cf. Carmi v. Metropolitan St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 1980) (McMillian, J., concurring) (although ap-
pellant in the instant case not covered under the Act, § 504 imposes general requirement upon
recipients of federal grants not to discriminate against employees).
30. Cf. Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Servs. Corp., 38 Colo.
App. 321, 559 P.2d 716 (1977) (court did not consider the issue of nature of aid to the institu-
tions).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
public school or school district,3' a city or other municipal body,32 or a city
hospital.33 Presumably, these publicly financed institutions received large
amounts of federal financial assistance that generally was not earmarked
for specific programs or activities. In fact, it would have been nearly im-
possible to distinguish those programs and activities that were federally
assisted from those that were not. Therefore, the courts in these cases were
not called upon to address the question of whether the section 504 mandate
is applicable to programs and activities not federally assisted. Hence, the
absence of language limiting the applicability of section 504 to programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance in the cases cited above simply
may be a result of the nature of the recipients and the nature of the federal
assistance involved rather than a judicial affirmation of the broader defini-
tion of "program or activity." 3
Definition Two: The Prohibition of Discrimination on the Basis of Handi-
cap in Employment as Limited to Programs or Activities
Actually Receiving Federal Financial Assistance
When a recipient is an institution that receives a limited amount of
federal assistance earmarked for a particular purpose or program, it no
longer is reasonable, in light of the language of section 504 and the im-
plementing regulations, to apply the section 504 mandate to all of the
employment decisions within that institution. Rather, the statutory language
prohibiting "discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance'"" compels the conclusion that when the federal aid
specifically is directed to an identifiable program or activity, the section 504
nondiscrimination mandate extends only to that program or activity.
The court in Proffitt v. Consolidation Coal Co."6 recognized this limita-
tion on the application of section 504 to a recipient's employment practices.
31. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556
F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1981); Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508
F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Whitaker
v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Zorick v. Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); Hart v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 625 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1980); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620
F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1980); Coleman v. Casey County Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ky.
1980); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980); Hart v. County
of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979); McGarvey v. District of Columbia, 468 F.
Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1979); Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Davis
v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
33. See, e.g., Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.,Pa. 1977).
34. But cf. Sabal v. Board of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 89 (D.N.J. 1981), and Hall v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 509 F. Supp. 841 (D. Md. 1981), where courts applied the Trageser limita-
tion, discussed at notes 57-66 and accompanying text infra, to utilities that were heavily publicly
financed.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979).
36. 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 382 (S.D.W. Va. 1979).
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In Proffitt, a trained coal mine electrician with sight in only one eye claimed
that a coal mining operation refused to hire him because of his blind eye.
The coal company participated in the Job Employer-Employee Program of
West Virginia (JEEP), an on-the-job training program under the Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA).37 As a partici-
pant in JEEP, the company received federal funds. The court, in consider-
ing the plaintiff's claim, addressed the issue of the scope of section 504's
mandate of nondiscrimination. The court held that the mandate did not
cover all of a recipient's employment practices,38 but rather related only to
those programs and activities actually receiving federal financial assistance.
The Proffitt court granted summary judgment for the coal company on the
plaintiff's section 504 claim because the plaintiff was not seeking employ-
ment in the company's federally assisted program.39
Similarly, the federal district court in Simon v. St. Louis City Police
Department"° held that a paraplegic former police officer "must allege that
the particular job category in which he was allegedly discriminated was a
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance"' to support his
claim that the police department violated section 504 by refusing to hire
him. Because of this failure to state a claim for which relief could be
granted, the court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. 2
More recently, the Seventh Circuit, considering the Simon decision, held
that there must be a nexus between the federal aid and the alleged
discriminatory act or omission for a plaintiff to prevail. In Simpson v.
Reynolds Metals Co.,"3 the court stated that "to be actionable, the
discrimination must come in the operation of the program or manifest itself
in a handicapped individual's exclusion from the program or a diminution
of the benefits he [or she] would otherwise receive from the program.'",
Although the court concluded that private recovery under section 504 is
restricted to intended beneficiaries, the court warned that the definition of
program and the corresponding identification of beneficiaries was not to be
narrowly determined.4 1
The narrower construction of section 504 that Proffitt, Simon, and Simp-
son" endorsed appears to have been adopted by the former Department of
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (1976 & Supp. Il 1979).
38. 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 385.
39. Id.
40. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
41. Id. at 1364.
42. Id. The plaintiff's amended complaint was reviewed in Simon v. St. Louis City County,
497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980), in which the court held that plaintiff failed to establish,
within the meaning of § 504, that he was an "otherwise qualified" individual who had been
discriminated against solely by reason of his handicap.
43. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 1232.
45. Id. at 1235.
46. The holding in Simpson was adopted in Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F.
Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1981), and in Meyerson v. State, 507 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1981). Both
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Health, Education and Welfare in its regulations implementing section
504.1' The language of the regulations limits the applicability of the section
504 nondiscrimination in employment mandate to employment practices
under programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. This con-
struction comports with the clear language of the statute, and with the
courts' reading of section 504 in Proffitt, Simon, and Simpson."
Alternatively, it could be argued that Senator Humphrey's
statement-that the provisions that ultimately became sections 503 and 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 carried through the intent of the original
bills he had introduced to amend Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19641 9-supports a broad interpretation of section 504 as covering all of
a recipient's programs and activities. Under this argument, the Senator's
statement would be indicative of a congressional intent to ban all employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of handicap, much like Title VII bans
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
gender, or religion. This reasoning, however, negates the express language of
section 504, which limits the nondiscrimination mandate to programs or ac-
tivities receiving federal financial assistance. Had Congress wished to im-
pose a broad ban on employment discrimination on the basis of handicap,
of these courts also adopted in some form the holding in Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation
Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1979), that § 504's mandate
against employment discrimination applies only to those programs or activities of which the
primary objective of the federal aid is to provide employment.
47. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-.14 (1981). Subpart B of the regulation, which pertains to
"Employment Practices," begins:
§ 84.11 Discrimination prohibited.
a) General
1) No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, be subjected
to discrimination in employment under any program or activity to which this part
applies [receiving federal financial assistance].
3) A recipient shall make all decisions concerning employment under any program
or activity to which this part applies [receiving federal financial assistance] in a
manner which ensures that discrimination on the basis of handicap does not occur
and may not limit, segregate, or classify applicants or employees in any way that
adversely affects their opportunities or status because of handicap. Id. § 84.11.
48. The regulations are important in construing § 504 in light of the congressional intention
that § 504 be implemented through regulations. As stated by the court in Doe v. Colautti, 454
F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979), "[tlhe legislative history of
the Rehabilitation Act does establish that the Secretary's interpretative regulations were to play
a central role in the administration and enforcement of section 504." 454 F. Supp. at 629.
Two courts have rejected challenges of constitutionality to different parts of the HEW regu-
lations. See Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 640 (S.D. Tex.
1978) (the regulations concerning education are reasonably related to the purposes of § 504);
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) (procedural regulations do not violate either the due
process or equal protection guarantees).
49. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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it could have amended Title VII rather than patterning section 504 on the
less inclusive Title VI. 0
Furthermore, under the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,"' remedies, procedures, and rights available under Title VII were
granted to federal employees complaining of handicap discrimination in
employment in violation of section 50152 of the Act," while the remedies,
procedures, and rights available under Title VI were made available to com-
plainants under section 504. 5  These amendments indicate that Congress did
not intend, in enacting section 504, to impose a general ban on handicap
discrimination in employment. Rather, similar to Title VI, the section 504
mandate is limited to prohibiting discrimination in relation to federal finan-
cial assistance.
In sum, a limitation of the section 504 mandate to "discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance ' 5 5 may result
in the scope of section 504 being dependent upon the nature of the federal
assistance the recipient received. When a recipient receives large amounts of
federal monies that are not earmarked for specific programs or activities,
section 504 may be applicable to many or all of the recipient's employment
decisions. 6 Such a result is unavoidable when federally assisted programs
and activities cannot be separated from unassisted programs and activities.
When a recipient receives federal funding that is limited to a specific pro-
gram or activity, however, a more limited application of section 504 would
be required under the language of the statute. This limitation on the ap-
plication of the section 504 nondiscrimination mandate to federally assisted
programs and activities has been endorsed by the courts in Proffitt, Simon,
and Simpson, and by the former Department of Health, Education and
Welfare in its section 504 regulations.
Definition Three: Section 504 as Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis
of Handicap in Employment Only in Programs of which
the Primary Objective of the Federal Aid is the Provi-
sion of Employment
The Fourth Circuit, in Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc.,57
50. See notes 9, 10 & 23 supra.
51. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Development Disabilities Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i
(Supp. III 1979)).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. 1II 1979). Section 501 requires that federal agencies adopt affirma-
tive action plans designed to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped in-
dividuals.
53. Id. § 794a(a)(l).
54. Id. § 794a(a)(2).
55. Id. § 794.
56. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
57. 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
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found "program," in the context of a section 504 employment discrimina-
tion claim, to mean a federally assisted program of which the primary ob-
jective is to provide employment. This definition of "program" is
significantly narrower than either of the two definitions discussed above.
In Trageser, the plaintiff, a registered nurse, filed suit claiming that she
was constructively discharged in violation of section 504 because of her
deteriorating vision. Her employer, Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., was
a private nursing home that received substantial federal assistance in the
form of Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Administration, and welfare
payments. The court analyzed Ms. Trageser's claim in light of the 1978
amendments" to the Rehabilitation Act. These amendments include section
505(a)(2) which provides:
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act
or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider
of such assistance under Section 794 [Section 504] of this title.' 9
In availing section 504 complainants of the remedies, procedures, and rights
set forth in Title VI, Congress further implemented its intent, expressed in
the 1974 legislative history, that section 504 be "patterned after, and . . .
almost identical to," Title VI.6
The key provision of Title VI is section 601.6 ' Section 601 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin under any
federally-assisted program or activity. Section 60462 and the HEW regula-
tions63 restrict the Title VI mandate of nondiscrimination on the basis of
58. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (Supp. I11 1979).
60. S. REp. No. 1270, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 120 CONG. REc. 35003,
35010 (1974). Section 504 was patterned after § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1976), and § 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976)
(pertaining to gender). Despite the similarity in the statutory language of these three provis-
ions, the applicability of each provision to employment practices is different.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
62. Id. § 2000d-3.
63. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(c)(3) (1980). The text provides:
Where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is not to provide
employment, but discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin in
the employment practices of the recipient or other persons subject to the regulation
tends, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, to exclude individuals from
participation in, to deny them the benefits of, or to subject them to discrimination
under any program to which this regulation applies, the foregoing provisions of
this paragraph (c) [regulating employment practices] shall apply to the employment
practices of the recipient or other persons subject to the regulation, to the extent
necessary to assure equality of opportunity to, and nondiscriminatory treatment of,
beneficiaries.
Id. Section 80.3(c) of the regulations extends the nondiscrimination mandate to instances where
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin tends to cause
discrimination against the primary beneficiaries (e.g., students) of the federal aid. See, e.g.,
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race, color, or national origin in employment to federally aided programs
of which the primary objective of the assistance is the provision of employ-
ment,6" and to situations when employment discrimination by the recipient
tends to cause or "necessarily causes discrimination against the primary
beneficiaries of the aid."
'6 5
The Trageser court reasoned that, in the absence of contrary legislative
history,6 6 the extension of Title VI remedies, procedures, and rights to sec-
tion 504 complainants would require the incorporation of the section 604
limitation into the section 504 scheme. Based on this reasoning, the court
concluded that the section 504 nondiscrimination in employment mandate is
limited to federally aided programs of which the primary objective of the
aid is to provide employment, and to situations when employment
discrimination tends to cause or necessarily causes discrimination against
the primary beneficiaries of the federal aid. The court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of Trageser's claim, concluding that the primary objective
of federal aid to the nursing home was to provide medical and supervisory
care, not to provide employment.
Several courts have adopted the Trageser interpretation of the 1978
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act. 67 The Seventh Circuit, in Simpson
United States v. El Camino Community College, 454 F. Supp. 825 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 600
F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
64. Examples of programs of which the primary objective of the federal assistance is to
provide employment include: the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); college work study programs under the Higher
Education Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2757 (1976); and projects under the Public Works
Acceleration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2643 (Supp. I1 1979).
65. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 88 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
66. The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments gives no guidance as to why the
remedies, procedures, and rights under Title VI were made available to § 504 complainants.
Also, through the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, Congress made the remedies,
procedures, and rights under Title VII available to § 501 complainants. 42 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2)
(Supp. lII 1979). Section 501 requires federal agencies to adopt affirmative action plans to
employ and advance in employment handicapped persons. Id. § 791(b). There is legislative
history that suggests that Congress made the Title VII rights and remedies available to § 501
complainants because it believed that § 501 established the federal government as an "equal
opportunity employer." Thus Title VII-which broadly bans employment discrimination-was
the logical source of remedies, procedures, and rights. See 124 CONG. REc. 15591 (1978). Sec-
tion 504, however, regulated recipients of federal assistance and was patterned after Title VI.
See note 23 supra. Thus the logical source of remedies, procedures, and rights under § 504 was
Title VI. Cf. Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (since § 504 was
modeled after Title VI, it should be construed as creating a private cause of action for han-
dicapped job seekers). For a discussion of Hart, see notes 75-83 and accompanying text infra.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1981)
(hospital's receipt of Medicare and Medicaid funds does not constitute receipt of federal finan-
cial assistance under § 504); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th
Cir. 1980) (relief denied where plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary of EPA construction
and engineering grants to sewer district); Brinkley v. Department of Pub. Safety, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 164 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (clerk-dispatcher failed to show that primary purpose of
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v. Reynolds Metals Co., 6I expanded the Trageser interpretation, and noted
that, under certain circumstances, an "infection theory" justified applica-
tion of section 504 to all employment practices of a recipient institution.
6 9
The "infection theory" applies when employment discrimination by a recipi-
ent of federal aid against nonbeneficiaries also affects intended beneficiaries
of the aid."° The "infection theory" is codified in the Health and Human
Services regulations" and has been followed by some courts in actions
brought under Title VI." In Simpson, the court found the theory inap-
plicable because alleged discrimination against a handicapped person in an
isolated segment of Reynolds Metals did not "infect" the company in a
manner that would affect participants in the federally funded work training
program.' 3 The court stated, however, that the "holding should not be in-
support for her department was to provide employment); Proffitt v. Consolidation Coal Co.,
21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 382 (S.D.W. Va. 1979) (handicapped plaintiff denied relief where the
primary objective of federal program was to provide employment but plaintiff was not seeking
employment under the program); Zorick v. Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(blind plaintiff's § 504 claim denied where no federal assistance to the county was intended to
provide employment). See also Sabal v. Board of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 892 (D.N.J. 1981); Hall
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 509 F. Supp. 841 (D. Md. 1981); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F.
Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1981); Lestrange .v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 501 F. Supp. 964 (M.D. Pa.
1980); Simon v. St. Louis County, 497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Guertin v. Hackerman,
496 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health
Servs. Corp., 43 Colo. App. 446, 614 P.2d 891 (1979).
68. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
69. Id. at 1235 n.16.
70. Id.
71. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(c)(3) (1980). See note 63 supra, for the text of this regulation.
72. See United States v. El Camino Community College, 454 F. Supp. 825, 831 (C.D. Cal.
1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). In El Camino,
for example, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), under authority of Title VI, sought to in-
vestigate all of the College's employment practices for possible discrimination against Spanish-
surnamed individuals. The College refused to accede to the part of the investigation that bore
on employment practices unrelated to the program receiving federal funds. The El Camino
court held that the OCR maintained authority to investigate all employment practices to deter-
mine whether discrimination, if it existed, in programs not federally assisted caused discrimina-
tion against intended beneficiaries of federally assisted programs. 454 F. Supp. at 831. The
court recognized that § 604 of Title VI generally restricts administrative action with respect to
employment practices when the primary objective of the federal financial assistance is to pro-
vide employment. Id. The court concluded, however, that 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(c)(3), see note 63
supra, provides an exception to the provisions of § 604 when discrimination in unassisted
programs causes discrimination in federally assisted programs. 454 F. Supp. at 831. See also
Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 610-11 & n.II (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Jef-
ferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 883 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
73. 629 F.2d at 1235 n.16. The plaintiff, in Simpson, alleged that the company had
discharged him because of his alcoholism, a disability that he claimed qualified him as an
"otherwise handicapped person" under § 504. Id. at 1231 n.8. The plaintiff further alleged
that the company received federal assistance in an on-the-job training program for veterans,
thereby causing the § 504 mandate to apply to the company. Id. at 1231-32. In accord with the
Trageser interpretation of § 504, however, the court rejected his claim because he was not a
participant in the federally assisted program. Id. at 1235-36. See notes 57-66 and accompanying
text supra.
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terpreted as foreclosing the possibility that in the future a handicapped in-
dividual, not himself [or herself] involved in a federally funded program,
may be able to recover if he [or she] can show that the discrimination
against him somehow affected the intended beneficiaries of the
assistance.""
One post-Trageser court explicitly has refused to adopt the Trageser ra-
tionale that a section 504 claim is actionable only when a primary objective
of federal aid is to provide employment. In Hart v. County," which con-
cerned the refusal of the County Probation Department to employ a "con-
trolled epileptic," the court expressly rejected the Trageser incorporation of
section 604 of Title VI into the scheme of section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act. 6 The court declared that it could not accept the two
significant assumptions the Trageser court made." Specifically, the Trageser
court had assumed that although the language of section 604 is directed only
to enforcement actions by any governmental department or agency, section
604 also restricts private suits under Title VI. The Hart court rejected that
assumption, stating that no authority suggests that Congress intended the
section 604 restrictions to apply to private actions.79
The Hart court also rejected the second Trageser assumption that in enac-
ting the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, Congress intended to
restrict the scope of section 504 by incorporating the section 604 limitation'.
The court observed that the legislative history surrounding the 1978 amend-
ments did not manifest a restrictive intent." Indeed, the Hart court cited
legislative history supporting its interpretation that the 1978 amendments
were meant to expand the remedies section 504 provided.8' The court ex-
74. 629 F.2d at 1235 n.16.
75. 485 F: Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
76. Id. at 71-72. Although the probation department received federal assistance through
revenue sharing funds, none of the assistance was intended to provide employment. Id. at 67,
71. Consequently, under the narrow Trageser holding that § 504 allows a private remedy only
when a primary objective of the federal assistance is to provide employment, the plaintiff in
Hart would have been denied a remedy. See text accompanying notes 57-66 supra.
77. 485 F. Supp. at 72.
78. Id.
79. Id. The Hart court noted that § 604, which limits HEW enforcement of § 601, see
notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra, has been ignored by several courts in adjudicating
private employment discrimination actions under Title VI. Id. (citing Afro Am. Patrolmen
League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974). Ortiz v. Bach, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019
(D. Colo. 1977)).
80. 485 F. Supp. at 72-73. See note 66 supra.
81. In support of its argument that the 1978 amendments were intended to expand the
remedies available under § 504, the Hart court cited the following statement by Senator
Cranston:
Mr. President, I believe this amendment is much needed. To date, we have permit-
ted certain private enforcement of Title V [including § 5041 and, yet, we have not
provided the means by which such private rights of action are meaningful. This
amendment-providing attorney's fees on the same basis as attorney's fees are pro-
vided under Public Law 94-559-will go a long way toward assisting long-neglected
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plained that section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, makes
Title VI remedies, procedures, and rights available to section 504 com-
plainants, and was merely modeled after Title VI provisions rather than
restricted by them.82 Declining to adhere to the narrow Trageser approach,
the Hart court held that the handicapped plaintiff could sustain a right of
action under section 504.83
The lack of any cogent legislative history giving meaning to section
505(a)(2) makes it difficult to predict how other appellate courts, or
ultimately the Supreme Court, would resolve the issue presented in Trageser
and Hart. The language of section 505(a)(2)-"the remedies, procedures,
and rights set forth in Title VI . . . shall be available"'-could be inter-
preted to have made available to section 504 claimants only the mechanics
of Title VI. In other words, the procedural framework of Title VI is to be
available under section 504, as are the remedies and rights inherent in that
framework. This reading of section 505(a)(2) does not incorporate the
limitations of section 604 of Title VI into the Rehabilitation Act. This inter-
pretation is reasonable in that the section 604 limitation on programs
designed to provide employment functions to prevent conflict or overlap
with Title VII remedies for employment discrimination on the basis of race
or national origin. As Title VII does not embrace employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap, there is no conflict or overlap between sec-
tion 504 and Title VII. Yet the legislative history and statutory language are
such that a court could, and the Trageser court did, interpret section
505(a)(2) as making the substantive provisions of Title VI applicable to ac-
tions brought under section 504.
Finding little guidance in the statute or legislative history, the policies
supporting the respective treatments of section 505(a)(2) in Trageser and
Hart must be examined. The Trageser restriction protects a private, indirect
recipient of federal assistance from being compelled to expend potentially
large sums of money to comply with section 504." The nursing home defend-
ant in Trageser, a private institution, received federal assistance only in-
Americans-handicapped individuals-in their efforts to achieve their full and
equal share of the rights to which they are entitled.
Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. S15,591 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978)).
82. Id. at 72-73.
83. Id. at 73.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (Supp. I1 1979).
85. There have been numerous estimates as to how much compliance with § 504 would cost
recipients, ranging from between $.458 and $1.0 billion to between $6.6 and $7.0 billion. Im-
plementation of § 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1977) (statement of John
W. Adams, Director of Federal-State Relations for the Council of Chief State School Officers)
(hereinafter cited as Hearings]. According to Representative Jeffords, HEW projected an im-
plementation cost to recipients of $2.4 billion per year to comply with § 504. 123 CONG. REC.
17546 (1977). Rep. Jeffords collected data from a number of states and concluded that im-
plementation of § 504 would be more costly than the HEW projections indicated. Hearings,
supra, at 78-167.
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directly through primary beneficiaries' choices of where to spend their
Medicaid, Medicare, and welfare monies.86 Private institutions such as these
are unable to tap tax revenues to meet the financial burden of complying
with section 504. As one court remarked, applying section 504 to private in-
stitutions inequitably forces "substantial expenditures of private monies to
accommodate the federal government's generosity." 87 The Trageser ap-
proach thus avoids burdening private, indirect recipients by restricting the
"programs" to which section 504 is applicable.
This policy, however, suffers a major shortcoming. By limiting private
actions under section 504 to situations where a primary objective of federal
assistance is to provide employment, the Trageser restriction insulates not
only indirect recipients from the section 504 mandate, but insulates many
direct recipients as well. A better approach than the restriction the Trageser
court imposed would be to redefine "recipient" in a way that would ex-
clude indirect recipients from the sweep of section 504. Regardless, no
movement to do so is afoot in Congress, and courts have expressly refused
to interpret "recipient" so narrowly. 8 In sum, the Trageser restriction, nar-
rowly defining "program," is an insufficient means of achieving an other-
wise just objective. If the policy justification behind Trageser is the
avoidance of inequities resulting from the application of section 504 to in-
direct recipients, the Trageser approach is overinclusive.
Alternatively, the primary support for the broader Hart interpretation of
''program" is the undesirability of using any federal funds to support
discriminatory hiring practices. Unjustified discrimination against handicap-
ped job-seekers in any federally aided program constitutes federally assisted
job discrimination. Furthermore, a limitation on section 504's applicability
to programs in which the primary objective of the federal aid is to provide
86. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 88 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). See United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908 (2d
Cir. 1981) (a hospital's receipt of Medicare and Medicaid funds did not subject it to § 504's
mandate of nondiscrimination in employment).
87. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D.S.C. 1977). The court concluded,
however, that "[d]espite the obvious inequities inherent in the enforcement of this regulation
with respect to private institutions, there has been no challenge to its validity and this court is
bound by law to give it effect." Id. at 639.
88. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 265-67 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 485 F. Supp. 255, 261-62 (N.D. Tex.
1980); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529
F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). The district court in Bob Jones applied the Title VI mandate of non-
discrimination on the basis of race under federally assisted programs to the University because
of the University's participation in the Veteran's Assistance Program.
89. As noted in the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), discrimination has a greater detrimental impact when it is government assisted. The
Court, speaking of segregation in public schools, approvingly quoted the lower court, which
had reasoned: "The impact [of discrimination] is greater when it has the sanction of law; for
the policy [of discrimination] ... is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the [af-
fected] group." Id. at 494.
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employment appears contrary to the express goal of section 50490 to pro-
hibit discrimination against the handicapped. Thus, the Hart approach, for-
bidding discrimination against handicapped job-seekers in all federally
funded programs, better comports with the express section 504 goal than
the Trageser approach. The Hart reading of "program" also is mandated
by the generally accepted rule that civil rights statutes should be liberally
construed to realize the objectives of the legislation. 9' A liberal construction
of "program" under section 504 is especially necessary because Title VII,
which broadly bans employment discrimination in other areas, does not
reach discrimination against the handicapped. Accordingly, section 504 is
the only general statutory protection available to handicapped job-seekers.92
In sum, the policies underlying section 504 support the result in Hart
rather than that reached in Trageser. The Trageser holding, which permits
private actions only when the primary objective of the federal aid is to pro-
vide employment, contravenes the broad section 504 goal of avoiding the
involvement of federal funds in programs that are administered in a
discriminatory fashion. Absent meaningful legislative direction, the broader
Hart approach should be adopted because it furthers this goal.
II. SECTION 504 AND CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS:
NLRB v. CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO AND
FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
Under each definition of "program" examined in Part I, it can be argued
that the employment decisions made in church-related schools that receive
or benefit from federal financial assistance are subject to the section 504
mandate of nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap.93 If the first, broad
definition of "program" 9 is applied, it may be argued that all of the
90. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
91. E.g., Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (construing Civil Rights Act of 1964), reh'g
denied, 379 U.S. 995 (1964); Battista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965) (construing 42
U.S.C. § 1983). See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05, at
392 (4th ed. 1974).
92. In addition to the provisions of § 504, which prohibit discrimination against the han-
dicapped in federally funded programs in general, the Rehabilitation Act contains two prohibi-
tions against such discrimination in specific situations. Section 501 forbids employment
discrimination against the handicapped by the government itself. Section 503 provides a similar
prohibition that applies to employers accepting government contracts exceeding a certain sum.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 (1976). See generally Bayh, Foreword to the Symposium Issue On
Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 943 (1978) (delineating dif-
ferences between the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act).
93. Indeed, the only court to consider whether a religious organization is subject to § 504's
mandate indirectly ruled affirmatively. In Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F. Supp.
1021 (D. Kan. 1981), the court denied the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss, holding that there
was a factual dispute as to whether the primary objective of federal aid received was to provide
employment. The court did not consider the constitutionality of the application of § 504 to the
Archdiocese.
94. This definition holds that, under § 504, "programs" encompasses all of a recipient's
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employment decisions of church-related schools are under the aegis of sec-
tion 504. If the second definition of "program"" is adopted, it may be
argued that employment decisions of church-related schools that pertain to
the administration of federally assisted programs and activities are subject
to section 504 regulation. Finally, if the Trageser definition of "program ' 96
is upheld, employment decisions in church-related schools that pertain to
the administration of work-study programs and employment decisions
under other programs that "infect" the school in such a way as to result in
discrimination against handicapped students97 arguably could be subject to
section 504. Thus, regardless of what the scope of the mandate of section
504 may be, the issues of whether church-related schools were intended to
be subject to section 504, and whether such schools may be so subject in
light of the first amendment, survive.
The Statute and Legislative History
The question of whether the legislature intended to subject church-related
schools to section 504 may be answered by an examination of the statute's
broad language. The language of section 504 does not limit its coverage to
public organizations or agencies," nor does it distinguish between direct
and indirect recipients of federal assistance.9" Rather, section 504 apparently
anticipates broad coverage of all recipients of federal financial assistance.100
Thus, although a specific intent to include church-related schools is not
evidenced in the legislative history, inclusion is inferable from the statute's
sweeping language. 0o
As direct and indirect recipients of federal aid through participation in
the school lunch program,' °2 and in the aid that provides grants to children
programs and activities, even those that are unsupported by federal aid. See text accompanying
notes 27-28 supra.
95. Under the second definition, "program" refers only to federally assisted programs,
thereby insulating employers' unassisted activities from the aegis of § 504. See text accompany-
ing note 35 supra.
96. Trageser narrowly defined "program" under § 504 to include only those federal pro-
grams designed to provide employment. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
97. For a discussion of the infection theory see notes 67-73 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
99. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. Prior and subsequent legislative history sur-
rounding § 504 fails to mention church-related schools. In hearings before a House Subcom-
mittee, David Tatel, the director of the Office for Civil Rights of HEW, stated: "The enact-
ment of Section 504 and issuance of the implementing regulations represent a new era of civil
rights in our nation, and will have an impact on virtually every public school system, universi-
ty, social service agency and provider of health care in the United States." Implementation of
Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1977) (emphasis added).
102. National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769c (Supp. I11 1979).
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of low income families for their special educational needs, 03 church-related
elementary and secondary schools appear to be subject to the mandate of
section 504. A church-related institution of higher education may be subject
to section 504 through its participation in federal tuition assistance pro-
grams such as basic educational opportunity grants, federally insured stu-
dent loans, college work-study programs, and veterans' assistance.
The NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago Decision
In contrast to the legislative intent issue, the constitutionality of the ap-
plication of section 504 to church-related schools is an issue that is not so
easily resolved. The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago,' "" considered whether legislation regulating employment may be
applied to church-related schools. In Catholic Bishop, the Court was con-
fronted with the question of whether lay faculty members teaching both
religious and secular subjects at minor seminaries'0 , and Catholic high
schools were within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).' 0 The NLRB had found that the Catholic schools had violated the
National Labor Relations Act0 7 by refusing to recognize or bargain with
unions that were properly certified as representatives of the schools' lay
faculties.' 0 The NLRB ordered the schools to cease the unfair labor prac-
tices and to bargain collectively with the unions.'0 9 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit denied enforcement of the NLRB's orders, holding that the NLRB's
distinction between "completely religious" and "merely religiously
associated" was unworkable as a standard by which to decide whether to
exercise jurisdiction over church-related institutions.'' 0 The court of appeals
103. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386 (1976 &
Supp. 111 1979).
104. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
105. Minor seminaries are preparatory secondary schools in the Catholic seminary system.
Id. at 492.
106. The National Labor Relations Board had been asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit,
private secondary schools since 1971, after concluding such institutions had a sufficient and
growing involvement in interstate commerce so as to be subject to the Act. See, e.g., Shattuck
School, 189 NLRB 886 (1971). For a discussion of the history of the Board's treatment of
private schools, see Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 497.
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
108. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 NLRB 1221 (1976); Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, Inc., 224 NLRB 1226 (1976). The separate cases were consolidated on appeal. See
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977).
109. 224 NLRB 1221, 1224; 224 NLRB 1226, 1229.
110. 559 F.2d at 1118. In rejecting the standard that distinguished between "completely
religious" and "merely religiously associated" institutions, the Seventh Circuit reasoned:
We find the standard itself to be a simplistic black or white, purported rule con-
taining no borderline demarcation of where "completely religious" takes over or,
on the other hand, ceases. In our opinion the dichotomous "completely religious-
merely religiously associated" standard provides no workable guide to the exercise
of discretion.
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further held that the application of the National Labor Relations Act to the
Catholic schools violated the first amendment."' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari'2 to consider two questions: (1) whether teachers in
church-operated schools that teach religious and secular subjects are under
the jurisdiction of the NLRB; and (2) if the National Labor Relations Act
grants such jurisdiction to the NLRB, whether the exercise of jurisdiction
violates the guarantees of the religion clauses of the first amendment.'' 3
In addressing these issues, the Court declared that it must "determine
whether the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction here would give rise to
serious constitutional questions."'' 4 "If so," the Court continued, "we
must first identify 'the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed'
before concluding that the [National Labor Relations] Act grants jurisdic-
tion."'"' Applying this analysis, the Court first discussed whether the
NLRB's exercise of jurisdiction over a teacher who performs a "critical and
unique role . . . in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school"
would possibly create a conflict with the first amendment religion clauses.'6
Concluding that serious first amendment questions would arise out of
NLRB jurisdiction, the Court turned to the National Labor Relations Act
to determine whether such jurisdiction had been specifically conferred.'' 7
The Court found that an "examination of the statute and its legislative
history indicate[d] that Congress simply gave no consideration to church-
operated schools."'' 8 Because express congressional intent was absent, the
Court held that the Act did not confer upon the NLRB jurisdiction over
The Board had been following a policy of denying jurisdiction, as a matter of discretion,
over church-related institutions that were "completely religious," as opposed to "merely
religiously associated." Under this policy, the NLRB restrained from exercising jurisdiction
when schools were devoted exclusively to teaching religion or religious subjects. See, e.g.,
Association of Hebrew Teachers, 210 NLRB 1053 (1974); Board of Jewish Educ., 210 NLRB
1037 (1974). The Board asserted jurisdiction over church-related schools that provided a gen-
eral education based on religious principles as well as religious instruction. See, e.g., Cardinal
Timothy Manning, 223 NLRB 1218 (1976); Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 216 NLRB 249
(1975).
111. 559 F.2d at 1123, 1130. The court reasoned that because the religion clauses require
that parochial schools finance without governmental aid, the clauses must require that the
schools "be equally freed of the obviously inhibiting effect and impact of the restrictions of
the National Labor Relations Act." Id. at 1130.
112. 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
113. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 491 (1979).
114. Id. at 500, 501.
115. Id. at 501 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). By
using this mode of analysis, the Court implemented the prudential policy of avoiding a con-
stitutional question, when possible, through statutory construction. See, e.g., McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961).
116. 440 U.S. at 501. The Court anticipated serious first amendment questions primarily
concerning excessive entanglement of government with religion. Id. at 502. For a discussion of
entanglement, see notes 122-89 and accompanying text infra.
117. 440 U.S. at 504.
118. Id.
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teachers in church-related schools,'' 9 and it therefore was unnecessary to
resolve the "difficult and sensitive" first amendment questions that would
arise from a grant of jurisdiction.210
The Applicability of Section 504 to Church-Related Schools After
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
The mode of analysis the Supreme Court used in Catholic Bishop is par-
ticularly cogent as an approach to the problem of section 504 regulation of
employment in church-related schools. Both the problem the Court faced in
Catholic Bishop and the problem addressed in this Article concern the ap-
plication of laws regulating employment relationships within church-related
schools.
Utilizing the analysis set forth in Catholic Bishop to resolve the present
questions,' 2 ' it first must be determined whether the application of section
504's mandate to church-related schools would raise serious first amend-
ment questions. If constitutional questions would arise, the affirmative in-
tention of Congress would have to be clearly expressed in order to conclude
that section 504 was applicable to church-related schools.
Step One: First Amendment Problems Arising ,Out of the Application of
Section 504 to Church-Related Schools
Entanglement
The constitutional question that arises out of the application of Section
504's nondiscrimination in employment mandate that will be discussed first
is that of entanglement- the intrusion of government into the province of
119. Id. at 507.
120. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented from
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion on the ground that the majority's interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Act was not "fairly possible." Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The dissenters reasoned that Congress expressly deemed the Act applicable to all employers,
listing only eight exceptions to its otherwise all-inclusive language; church-operated schools
were not among the exceptions. Id. Moreover, the dissent noted that Congress had un-
equivocally rejected a proposal to exclude religious organizations from the Act's coverage. Id.
at 513. According to the dissenters, therefore, the majority's requirement of a "clear expres-
sion of an affirmative intention of Congress" before extending the Act to religious schools
amounted to a "cavalier exercise in statutory interpretation which succeeds only in defying
congressional intent." Id. at 518. Although the four dissenters concluded that the Act covered
religious schools, they did not speculate as to whether the actions of the NLRB in the case
violated the first amendment religion clauses' guarantees. Id.
121. At least one appellate court has followed the Supreme Court's mode of analysis. In
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), the court
considered the application of Title VII law to a seminary. The court acknowledged the
Supreme Court's Catholic Bishop analysis and held that the Constitution compels the conclu-
sion that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has no jurisdiction over the
seminary's relationship with its faculty. Id. at 284-87.
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religion. Before discussing the entanglement that arises out of the applica-
tion of section 504, however, the concept of entanglement must be ex-
plored.
A. Origins of Entanglement: The Establishment Clause Applied to
Parochial School Aid
The first amendment of the United States Constitution reads, in relevant
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . ". ." The two religion clauses of
the first amendment-the establishment clause and the free exercise clause-
have given rise to two distinct doctrines, both of which were developed to
guarantee the implicit promises, in the first amendment, of voluntarism'23
and of separation of church and state.' 2 4 The free exercise clause forbids
government interference' with an individual's religious beliefs.' 26 When the
122. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
123. The principle of voluntarism operates through the free exercise clause by requiring that
religious practices be voluntary, not forced or coerced, or burdened by government in-
terference. "[T]he Free Exercise Clause ... recognizes the value of religious training, teaching
and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own
course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise
Clause guarantees." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (prohibiting
prayer and Bible-reading in public schools). Professor Tribe argues that the establishment
clause also might be seen as an expression of voluntarism through the notion that advancement
of a church should come only from the voluntary support of its followers, and not from
governmental support. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 818-19 (1978).
124. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). The establishment clause, in
the spirit of this concern for the separation of church and state, prohibits state-established
religion. The Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946), discussed the
purpose of the establishment clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause means at least this: Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force or
influence a person to go or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance. . . .Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by
law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state."
Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
Separatism also operates through the free exercise clause. As Thomas Jefferson stated, "I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and
State." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1960) (quoting 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 113 (H.A. Washington, ed. 1854)).
125. A free exercise violation is premised on coercion or compulsion. Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). "It is necessary .. .for one to show the coercive effect
of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion." Id.
126. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court distinguished
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government restrains or interferes with conduct that is coupled with
religious belief, courts employ a balancing test to determine whether the
government regulation unconstitutionally burdens the free exercise of
religion. '27 The balancing test consists of weighing the burdens imposed on
the individual's exercise of religion against the compelling interest of the
state in enforcing the legislative scheme."'2  The government must
demonstrate not only a compelling state interest, but also that no alter-
between "religious belief" and "religious conduct." The Court emphasized that "[tihe door of
the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious
beliefs .. " Id. at 402 (emphasis in original). The belief-conduct distinction stems from Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where the Court stated that although the freedom to
believe is absolute, the freedom to act is not. Id. at 303-04. However, because of the heightened
constitutional protection afforded religious conduct, evidenced by Sherbert and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), two cases in which the Court protected religious conduct such as
not attending high school or working on the Sabbath, one scholar maintains that the belief-
conduct distinction has been obscured. See Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Stan-
dards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1234 [hereinafter cited as Mar-
cus]. Marcus maintains that the belief-conduct distinction is referred to in opinions but largely
unheeded.
127. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (establishing the modern free exer-
cise balancing test). If the circumstances warrant, before balancing the Court first may make a
threshold inquiry to ascertain the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court held that the state could not
compel Amish children to comply with compulsory school attendance laws against their
parents' wishes. Id. at 234-35. The Court's decision hinged on the sincerity and depth of the
Amish belief that sending their children to high school would endanger their salvation and that
of their children. The Court stated:
It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with . . . a group claiming to
have recently discovered some "progressive" or more enlightened process for rear-
ing children for modern life. Aided by a history of three centuries as an ident-
ifiable religious sect . . . the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the
sincerity of their religious beliefs . . . and the hazards presented by the State's en-
forcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id. at 235. See also Marcus, supra note 126, at 1242. Cf. cases discussed at note 148 infra (ex-
tent to which religion pervades a parochial school affects constitutionality of aid to the
school).
128. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a Seventh-
Day Adventist, was discharged by her employer for refusing to work on Saturday, her Sabbath
day. Id. at 399. When the state denied her unemployment compensation under those cir-
cumstances, she claimed that her religious freedom had been abridged. In determining the con-
stitutional issue, the Court balanced the plaintiff's interest in adhering to her religious scruples
by declining to work on Saturday against the state's interest in protecting itself against
fraudulent unemployment compensation claims. Id. at 403-07. The Court concluded that the
state's asserted interest proved insufficient to justify the burden on the plaintiff's exercise of
her religion. Id. at 409. For further elaboration on the free exercise balancing test, see Gian-
nella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part L The Religious
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967).
First amendment scholars have criticized the Supreme Court's balancing test as formless,
thus setting no rule of law to define the scope of first amendment protection of religious con-
duct. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 330 (1969);
Marcus, supra note 126, at 1240-43.
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native forms of regulation would infringe less on religious practices.'2 9
Under the establishment clause analysis, challenged legislation 3 ' must
meet the following three tests: (1) the legislation must have a secular
legislative purpose; (2) the primary effect of the legislation must neither in-
hibit nor advance religion; and (3) the legislation must not foster an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.' This tripartite test is
designed to guarantee an effective "wall of separation" between church and
state.132
The entanglement test, as noted above, has its origin in the establishment
clause. Indeed, one commentator has noted that the entanglement test has
become an integral part of establishment clause analysis and has been ap-
plied by the Supreme Court as "a distinct third test,"' 33 an "independent
measure of constitutionality."' 3 The Supreme Court opinions, however,
fall far short of clearly illuminating what constitutes excessive entangle-
ment.
In Walz v. Tax Commission, " the Supreme Court introduced the con-
cept of entanglement to help draw the line separating church and state in a
society with pervasive government regulation. 36 In discussing the entangle-
ment issue in the context of tax exemptions for churches, the Court stated
that the entanglement test was concerned with whether government involve-
ment with churches is excessive and whether the involvement required "of-
129. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
(1960).
130. The classic establishment clause challenges to legislation concern aid to parochial
schools. See, e.g., New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (state reimbursement
for parochial schools' expenses of performing state-required testing services); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state aid to parochial schools for instructional materials,
transportation, secular books, and speech and hearing services); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (state aid to private colleges, including four affiliated with the
Roman Catholic Church); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (state loan of secular text-
books and instructional materials to parochial schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1972) (state aid to parochial schools for maintenance and repair of buildings,
and tuition reimbursements to parents of parochial school children); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1973) (state authorization for the issuance of revenue bonds to higher educational institu-
tions, including a Baptist-controlled college); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(federal construction grants to church-related colleges); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (salary supplement to parochial school teachers and reimbursements to schools for in-
structional materials); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state loan of secular text-
books to parochial schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946) (bus fare reim-
bursements to parents of parochial school children).
131. The first two tests were first articulated in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1960). The third test was added by Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
All three tests were applied in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
132. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
133. Note, Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh Day Adventists: Expanding the
Application of Excessive Entanglement, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 345, 351 & n.35 (1978).
134. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-85 (1971).
135. 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
136. Id. at 670.
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ficial and continuing surveillance."' 7 The Walz Court upheld tax exemp-
tions for churches, as the exemptions met all three of the aforementioned
establishment clause tests, including the entanglement test.' 8
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,'" which involved a challenge to state statutes
that aided secular elements of instruction in elementary and secondary
religious schools, the Court further developed the entanglement concept. In
analyzing the entanglement issue, the Court conceded that absolute separa-
tion of church and state would be impossible; some contacts between the
two entities, such as through zoning regulations and compulsory school at-
tendance laws, are necessary and permissible.'4 0 Thus, while some contact
between government and religion is inevitable, the role of the establishment
clause "is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [government
or religion] into the precincts of the other."" Therefore, courts must
ultimately determine whether the entanglement is excessive by examining
"the character and purpose of the institutions that are benefited, the nature
of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority."'14 2
In Lemon, the Court found that the state's determination of whether
religious content was impermissibly interjected into state-aided secular in-
struction in church-related schools would require constant state
surveillance."43 The Court held that this surveillance, in addition to the state
inspection of schools' expenditure records, would create such "an intimate
and continuing relationship between church and state" that the statutes
conferring the aid were unconstitutional.""
Following its reasoning in Lemon, the Supreme Court reached a. similar
result in Meek v. Pittenger."" In Meek, the Court held that aid to church-
related schools in the form of auxiliary services and loans for instructional
materials violated the establishment clause."" Again, the Court emphasized
137. Id. at 674-75. The Wakz Court emphasized that tax exemption did not constitute direct
support for religion: "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with
involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and
detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory and administrative standards,
but that is not this case." Id. at 675.
138. The Court reasoned that the relationship between tax exemption and establishment of
religion was too remote to constitute an establishment clause violation. Id. at 675-76. In
analyzing the entanglement issue the Court noted that "[tihe hazards of churches supporting
government [if taxed] are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of government support-
ing churches .... " Id. at 675.
139. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
140. Id. at 614-15.
141. Id. at 614.
142. Id. at 615.
143. Id. at 620.
144. Id. at 621.
145. 421 U.S. 349 (1974).
146. Id. at 372. Auxiliary services under the challenged legislation included counseling,
testing, psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, services for exceptional and educa-
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the entangling consequences flowing from state attempts to ensure that aided
services were free from religious content.'47
Walz, Lemon, and Meek assess administrative entanglement in the con-
text of aid to churches and church-related schools.'48 Excessive entangle-
tionally disadvantaged students, and other services that "are of benefit to nonpublic school
children and are provided for public school children." Id. at 352 n.2.
The apparent consistency between the Lemon and Meek holdings should not imply that the
Supreme Court has established a clear dividing line between permissible and impermissible state
aid to secondary and elementary parochial schools. For instance, in the same vein as Meek and
Lemon, the Court has deemed unconstitutional: loans of secular instructional material to non-
public school students and funding of field trips, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); tax
benefits and tuition reimbursement for parents of children attending private schools, Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); and funding private schools for state-
mandated tests, Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). Conversely, the
Court found no clash with the establishment clause when the state furnished standardized tests
and scoring services, speech and hearing, and psychological services to private schools, Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); or when the government reimbursed parents of
children attending parochial schools for bus transportation to the schools, Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
The difficulty encountered in determining the constitutional dividing line in school aid cases
has led one author to note that "[it is not clear . . . why the first amendment permits books
approved by the public schools to be loaned to nonpublic school students and yet bars the lend-
ing of similaily approved films and film strips to these same students." Schotten, The
Establishment Clause and Excessive Governmental-Religious Entanglement: The Constitutional
Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207,
213 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schotten].
The Supreme Court's most recent establishment clause pronouncement in Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), sheds little light on the subject. In Regan, the
Court sustained the constitutionality of amended statutes that previously had been declared un-
constitutional in Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). The statutes pro-
vided reimbursement to nonpublic schools for state-mandated tests. In Regan, the Court
distinguished the earlier enactments on the ground that the Levitt tests were teacher-prepared
whereas the Regan tests were state-prepared. 444 U.S. at 652. Furthermore, the new enact-
ments provided auditing procedures to ensure that no funds were used for nonsecular pur-
poses. Id. Because the reimbursed services were discrete and identifiable, the Court concluded
that entanglement concerns were absent under the new legislative scheme. Id. at 660.
147. 421 U.S. at 372. In addition to the administrative entanglement, both Meek and Lemon
stressed the potential for political entanglement. Id.; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 662
(1971). In Meek, the Court explained that "the prospect of repeated confrontation between
proponents and opponents of the auxiliary-services program" could result in "political
fragmentation along religious lines .. " 421 U.S. at 372. The sensitivity to the potential for
political divisiveness present in the school-aid entanglement cases apparently owes its origin to
an influential law review article by Professor Paul Freund. See Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1691-92 (1969). The article has been cited in
several Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366
(1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 691 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Id. at 698 (Harlan, J., concurring). But see Valente & Stanmeyer, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools-A Reply to Professor Freund, 59 GEO. L.J. 59 (1970).
148. Lemon and Meek both involved aid to church-related secondary schools. The Court has
been less prone to find excessive entanglement in legislative schemes that provide aid to
religiously affiliated colleges dnd universities. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
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ment in these contexts manifests itself as a continuing surveillance and
evaluation of religious content by government authorities."4 9
B. Entanglement as a Free Exercise Theory
The Supreme Court's concern about entanglement in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago '5 stemmed from circumstances similar to those in the
school aid cases. In Catholic Bishop, the Court expressed the concern that
the "very process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions" in unfair
labor practice hearings, as well as the conclusions the NLRB ultimately
reached, might impinge on the first amendment religious guarantees.' The
Court stated that "[glood intentions by government [i.e., the NLRB]-or
third parties-can surely no more avoid entanglement with the religious
mission of the school in the setting of mandatory collective bargaining than
in the well-motivated legislative efforts consented to by the church-operated
schools which we found unacceptable in Lemon, Meek, and Wolman [v.
Walter]."' 2 As in the school aid cases, the Court in Catholic Bishop was
U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of noncategorized grants to sectarian colleges);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state issuance of revenue bonds for a Baptist-controlled
college does not violate the establishment clause); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(sustaining constitutionality of construction grants to sectarian colleges). Entanglement con-
cerns are minimized because the religious element is substantially less pervasive in church-
related colleges than in religious secondary and elementary schools. Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. at 750-52, 762. Cf. Schotten, supra note 146, at 244 (the religious character
of parochial schools is less substantial than the Court assumes). The Court in Roemer thus ex-
plains that the school aid cases "are better reconciled in terms of the character of the aided in-
stitution." 426 U.S. at 762 (emphasis added). But see note 146 supra. Hence, government
scrutiny under § 504 of the employment practices of church-related colleges may give rise to
fewer entanglement concerns than those expressed in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (minor seminaries and high schools). See notes 122-23 and accompanying
text supra, and notes 161-77 and accompanying text infra.
149. The excessive entanglement test is not without its disapproving critics. Professor Gian-
nella asserts:
[I]f the concept of "excessive entanglement" is to be taken seriously, it raises more
questions than it answers. Its broad and amorphous nature makes predictability an
impossibility unless the Court refines and reduces it to more precise guidelines. The
Court is not likely to do this. . . .There is the likelihood that entanglement will
turn into a convenient label to help the Court announce decisions arrived at on
other grounds more difficult to articulate in terms of consistent legal theory.
Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971
SUP. CT. REV. 147, 148. Professor Giannella seems to be almost prescient in light of NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Another author has remarked that the Court
has applied the entanglement test so inconsistently that the test has provided a rationalization,
rather than a rationale, for Court decisions. Schotten, supra note 146, at 215.
150. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In Catholic Bishop, the Court avoided deciding the constitutional
issue of entanglement by narrowly construing the National Labor Relations Act. See note 120
and text accompanying notes 117-20 supra.
151. 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
152. Id. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court held that the provision of in-
structional materials, equipment and field trip services to nonpublic schools was unconstitu-
tional.
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concerned with government evaluation of religious content. Specifically, the
Court questioned the constitutionality of the NLRB's scrutiny of reasons
for the discharge or discipline of a teacher-union member coupled with con-
tinuing surveillance of school operations. '53
The implicit application of the entanglement theory in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop demonstrates that entanglement theory is relevant not only in
evaluating establishment clause problems, but also in evaluating free exer-
cise clause problems. 5 " The problem in Catholic Bishop arose because of
the special church-teacher relationship in church-operated schools, where
the teacher plays "a critical and unique role . . . in fulfilling the mission"
of the school.' The potential entanglement involved in this kind of situa-
tion, as opposed to that in the provision of aid to a parochial school, con-
cerns encroachment on the right of church-operated schools to direct their
teachers. Thus, implicit in the reasoning and holding of the Supreme Court
is a recognition that entanglement theory is useful in guaranteeing free exer-
cise of religion under the first amendment.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted this entanglement reasoning in its review of
free exercise challenges to government regulation of the employment prac-
tices of religious institutions. In McClure v. Salvation Army, 6 the Fifth
Circuit declared that the application of. Title VII to the employment prac-
tices of the Salvation Army regarding its "officers" [ministers]' 57 in the
Army's Public Relations Department violated the first amendment free ex-
ercise guarantee. The court was concerned that, under Title VII, regulation
of the employment relationship between a church and its ministers would
result in excessive government entanglement with religion. Such regulation
would entail government intervention into substantive ecclesiastical matters
and matters of church administration that lie at the "heart of any religious
organization." The coercive effect implicit in such government involvement,
153. 440 U.S. at 502-04.
154. The Catholic Bishop Court did not specify which religion clause-free exercise or
establishment-might be violated by NLRB jurisdiction over the religious schools. See 440 U.S.
at 499, 502. One scholar concludes that the Court intended to implicate both clauses as subject
to entanglement analysis. See Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten
Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1195, 1213-14 (1980). Professor Ripple views the en-
tanglement concept as an important theme, although unstated, in the Court's traditional free
exercise analysis. Id. at 1210. Viewed in this light, the decision in Catholic Bishop simply
establishes a more definite link between an articulated entanglement test and the free exercise
clause. Id. at 1210, 1214.
155. Id. at 501.
156. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
157. The plaintiff in this case, McClure, was commissioned as an officer [minister] in 1967
after undergoing a two year training period at the Salvation Army's Officers Training School.
McClure alleged that her discharge from her position as a secretary in the Territorial Head-
quarter's Public Relations Department was attributable to complaints she voiced to her
superiors and the EEOC of discriminatory employment practices. These complaints involved
smaller salaries and fewer benefits for women than those accorded to similarly situated male
officers. Id. at 555.
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the McClure court concluded, could only produce "the very opposite of
that separation of church and state contemplated by the First
Amendment."' Since application of Title VII to the employment relation-
ship between the Salvation Army and its officers would violate the free ex-
ercise guarantee, the court held that Congress could not have intended to
regulate that employment relationship, and dismissed the complaint for
want of jurisdiction.' 59 In essence, the McClure court applied the same
analysis that the United States Supreme Court later promulgated in NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago-that government regulation of the employ-
ment practices of religious institutions will be permitted only when Congres-
sional legislation clearly expresses this affirmative intention."'
In EEOC v. Mississippi College,'6 ' a Mississippi district court denied en-
forcement of a subpoena the EEOC issued in connection with a charge of
discrimination that a female assistant professor had filed against a Baptist
college. In so ruling, the district court implied that conferring jurisdiction
on the EEOC to investigate the college's employment decision regarding the
female professor would result in excessive entanglement of the government
with religion.6'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit' 63 held that application of Title VII to the
college violated neither the establishment clause nor the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. The court found the McClure'" construction of
Title VII-that excessive entanglement would result from the application of
Title VII to the employment relationship between a seminary and its
ministers-uncontrolling with regard to the employment relationship be-
tween the college and its faculty and staff.'6 5 The court noted that, unlike
the employment of ministers in McClure, the employment decisions of the
college regarding its faculty members were not "matters of church ad-
ministration and government ... purely of ecclesiastical cognizance."' 66 The
158. Id. at 560.
159. Id. at 560-61. See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500-02
(1979) (because of the lack of express intention by Congress to confer on the NLRB jurisdic-
tion over parochial schools, the Court would not infer intent due to the risk of infringement of
the religion clauses); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (the pur-
pose of § 702 of Title VII is to deprive the EEOC of jurisdiction when its exercise would infr-
inge the religion clauses), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
160. For a discussion of the Catholic Bishop case, see notes 104-21 and accompanying text
supra.
161. 451 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 1978).
162. Id. at 567. The Mississippi College court cited the entanglement language in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) and Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112,
1125 (7th Cir. 1977). 451 F. Supp. at 566 nn. 3 & 4.
163. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912
(1981).
164. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). See notes 156-60 and accom-
panying text supra.
165. 626 F.2d at 485.
166. Id. (quoting McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972)).
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faculty members did not perform a religious function other than as "ex-
emplars of practicing Christians.""'6 The court accordingly held that Title
VII could be applied to the employment relations of the college regarding
its faculty without unconstitutionally entangling the government with
religion.' 68
A recent Fifth Circuit decision clarifies that court's interpretation of the
constitutional problems attendant to the application of employment laws to
religious institutions. In EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary,'69 the court addressed the question of whether Title VII ° confer-
red jurisdiction on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
regulate and review a Baptist seminary's employment practices. The district
court considered the case to constitute "a pure question of entanglement
'
"'
6
'
and held that application of Title VII to the employment relationships be-
tween the Seminary and its faculty and support personnel infringed upon its
right of free exercise under the first amendment.' 2 The district court had
noted that the Seminary's employment decisions were "steeped in a percep-
tion of divine will," making them "inseparable from its mission."' 3 In
light of this, the district court reasoned that enforcement of Title VII claims
against the Seminary would lead to excessive government entanglement with
religion "in the process of dissecting [the Seminary's] employment functions
into religious and secular components. . . . 1
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion regarding the
Seminary's relationship with its faculty and reversed the district court as to
support personnel.".' The court discussed McClure and Mississippi College
at length, and concluded that the pervasively sectarian nature of the
Southwestern Baptist seminary and the important religious functions of the
faculty required exemption from Title VII for those employees.' 6 The
167. 626 F.2d at 485. The court's distinction of McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553
(5th Cir. 1972), is unsatisfactory. The plaintiff in McClure, although titled "minister," was a
secretary in the Salvation Army's Territorial Headquarter's Public Relations Department. Id.
at 555. The lesson of Mississippi College and McClure, therefore, is that a religious organiza-
tion can exempt itself from Title VI1 by awarding religious titles to its employees.
168. 626 F.2d at 485.
169. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 485 F. Supp. 255 (N.D.
Tex. 1980).
170. See note 10 supra.
171. 485 F. Supp. at 259. The court identified that question as "whether the religious ex-
emption contained in Title V11 of the Civil Rights Act [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1976)] is adequate
when applied to a seminary to assure the degree of separation between church and state re-
quired by the free exercise clause of the first amendment." 485 F. Supp. at 259. The court
stated that as a pure question of entanglement, the issue could not be "obviated by statutory
construction in the manner of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago." Id.
172. Id. at 260.
173. Id. at 261.
174. Id.
175. 651 F.2d at 284-87.
176. Id.
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Seminary's relationship with support and certain administrative staff was
held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the EEOC. 77 Thus, in the Fifth
Circuit, it is the religiosity of the institution and the role the employee plays
in the sectarian function of the institution that determines whether the ap-
plication of Title VII to the employment relationship is constitutionally per-
missible.
Not all federal courts addressing the employment-entanglement question
have agreed that the application of Title VII to teachers in religious institu-
tions would unconstitutionally entangle government with religion, as did the
courts in Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and McClure. A
district court had declared that the application of Title VII to a religious
high school's employment practices relating to its teachers did not excessive-
ly entangle government with religion and denied the school's motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment. In Dolter v. Wahlert High School,"8 a
Catholic high school teacher had been discharged because she was single
and pregnant, apparently having violated the religion's prohibition of
premarital sex. The District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, apply-
ing the analysis set forth in Catholic Bishop of Chicago, first found the af-
firmative intention of Congress to include church-related schools in its ban
on discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.' 9 The
court then rejected the school's claim that application of Title VII to this
employment practice resulted in excessive entanglement in violation of the
first amendment free exercise clause. The court noted that application of
Title VII would not necessitate review of the Catholic Church's doctrine or
moral code, but only a determination of whether its employment criteria
were imposed equally on men and women.' 80
C. Entanglement Theory as Applied to Section 504
Regulation of employment relationships under section 504 is similar to
that under Title VII,' 8' although the enforcement schemes differ. Under sec-
177. Id.
178. 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
179. Id. at 269.
180. Id.
181. Governmental regulation of employment relationships in religious institutions under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), has been found to
be constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d
879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954); Marshall v. Pacific Union Conf. of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5956 (C.D. Cal. 1977). However, government regulation
under § 504 is more similar to that under Title VII than that under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), as Title VII and § 504 require a more pervasive investigation into and evaluation
of employment decisions that may be related to the schools' religious mission. Although some
inquiry into employment decisions is made under the FLSA, it is far less intrusive into the
schools' religious functions. This is because the FLSA seeks merely to ensure that all
employees are paid the minimum wage and overtime compensation without further inquiry into
the employer's decisions. See also Comment, Are Churches Above the Law? The Application
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Equal Pay Provisions of Title VII to Religious
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tion 504, an official of the Department of Health and Human Services con-
ducts a periodic review of recipients to ensure compliance with the man-
dates of section 504.182 If an individual files a written complaint alleging
discrimination, a Department official conducts an investigation18 of the
charge and attempts to resolve the matter informally through conciliation
and voluntary compliance."18 If the recipient still refuses to comply, after an
opportunity for a hearing, federal assistance will be terminated upon an ex-
press finding of discrimination on the record.18 Thus, an inquiry into an
alleged unlawful employment practice under section 504 is similar to an in-
quiry into an alleged unlawful employment practice under Title VII,1
8 6
which is in turn similar to an inquiry into unfair labor practice allegations
under the National Labor Relations Act.
187
The inquiry into employment practices under either Title VII or section
504 can be seen as most potentially damaging to the first amendment free
exercise guarantee when the motive behind an employment decision is at
issue. A first amendment problem develops when a church-related school
teacher alleges that discrimination on the basis of handicap motivated his or
her discharge or discipline, but the church-related school maintains that the
reason for the school's decision was that the teacher was not capable of
fulfilling his or her role in the religious mission of the school. In such cases,
the government may be called upon to inquire into and evaluate the validity
of the church-related school's motivation. This type of inquiry and evalua-
tion may constitute an entangling breach of the "wall of separation" con-
structed by the first amendment.
In light of the significant risk of a first amendment violation,' section
504 should not be construed as encompassing the employment relationship
between a church-related school and its teachers. Whether section 504
should be construed as encompassing the employment relationships between
church-related schools and their nonteaching employees would depend on
the function of the employee in relation to the church's mission. '89
Organizations, 40 U. PiTr. L. REv. 465 (1979) (both the FLSA and Title VII are reconcilable
with the first amendment).
182. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(a) (1980).
183. Id. § 80.7(b).
184. Id. § 80.7(d).
185. Id. § 80.8(c).
186. Title VII provides for an EEOC investigation into charges and an attempted concilia-
tion between parties. If no conciliation is reached, the grievant is allowed to bring suit against
the employer. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) (1976).
187. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979), for a discussion of
the inquiry into and resolution of unfair labor practices as potentially impinging on first
amendment rights.
188. See notes 181-87 and accompanying text supra.
189. See, e.g., King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding an
FCC antibias regulation as applied to job positions having no substantial connection with pro-
gram content and positions under programs having no religious dimension); EEOC v. Pacific
Press Publishing Ass'n, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30, 522 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (a religious publishing
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Conditioning a Benefit on a Burden to Free Exercise
Another first amendment problem that would arise should section 504 be
held applicable to church-related schools concerns the constitutionality of
conditioning a benefit on a burden to free exercise rights. In this situation,
federal financial assistance in the form of school lunches and tuition
assistance is conditioned on the requirement of incurring substantial expen-
ditures to retrofit buildings or to otherwise accommodate handicapped
employees. The requirement of enduring the potentially entangling regula-
tion of employment relationships places a further burden on the receipt of
financial assistance.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of con-
ditioning a benefit on a burden to free exercise rights in Sherbert v.
Verner.""° The appellant, Sherbert, was a Seventh-Day Adventist discharged
by her employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day
of her religion.' 9' Because of her inability to work on Saturday, she was
unable to find new employment after her termination. She then filed a
claim for unemployment compensation benefits, which the South Carolina
Employment Security Commission rejected. The County Court of Common
Pleas and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's
finding that she was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits
because she failed to accept available and suitable work.' 9
By declaring Sherbert ineligible for benefits, the state courts that reviewed
the Commission's decision rejected Sherbert's constitutional claim that the
determination of ineligibility infringed on her freedom to observe her
religious beliefs.'"9 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the disqualification for benefits burdened, albeit indirectly, the appellant's
free exercise of her religion.' 4 Furthermore, South Carolina could advance
no compelling state interest in the present enforcement of the Act's eligibility
provision sufficient to justify the substantial infringement of Sherbert's first
amendment rights.'" In its discussion 'of the burden on free exercise rights,
house's employment relationship with its secretaries does not constitute excessive
entanglement); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (a typist-receptionist's employment by a religious corporation was held to be
within the scope of Title VII). But cf. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.
1972) (the employment relationship between a church and its minister was held to be outside
the scope of Title VII due to the intrusion by the State into church administration and govern-
ment).
190. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
191. The Court stated there was no doubt that the prohibition against work on Saturday
was a basic tenet of the Seventh-Day Adventist creed. Id. at 399 n.l.
192. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act provided that a claimant was
ineligible for benefits if he or she failed, without good cause, to accept available and suitable
work when offered to him or her by the employment office or employer. 41 S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-120 (1976).
193. 374 U.S. at 401.
194. Id. at 403-04.
195. Id. at 409.
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the Court declared: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may [not] be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege." '' 9 6 The Court stated further that
conditioning the availability of benefits on the appellant's willingness to
violate a central principle of her religious faith effectively penalized the free
exercise of her constitutional freedoms.'9 7
The burden on the free exercise rights of church-related schools that com-
pliance with section 504 imposes is not as clear-cut and obvious as the
burden on free exercise Sherbert faced in her quest for unemployment com-
pensation. The burden in the church-related school context results from the
need for church-related schools to retrofit buildings or to otherwise accom-
modate handicapped employees.' 98 This retrofit of school facilities or provi-
sion of services typically calls for substantial expenditures' 99 drawn from
196. Id. at 404. The Court cited a long line of cases invalidating conditions and qualifications
upon governmental privileges and benefits because of their tendency to inhibit constitutionally
protected activity. Id. at 404-05 n.6. One of the cases cited by the Sherbert Court was
American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1952). In Douds, the Court rejected
the NLRB's argument that the noncommunist affidavit requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act
did not raise a problem under the first amendment because the Board's sole sanction against
the noncomplying union was withdrawal of the privilege of using its facilities. Justice
Frankfurter wrote, "Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life but if it af-
fords them it cannot make them available in an obviously arbitrary way or exact surrender of
freedoms unrelated to the purpose of the facilities." Id. at 417 (Frankfurter, J., concurring ex-
cept as to Part VII). See also Wilcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned
Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 39 (1955) (discussion of Douds). Cf. Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (residency requirement as a condition to an
indigent's receipt of non-emergency hospitalization or medical care burdens the right to travel);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (denial of welfare assistance to individuals with less
than one year residency held unconstitutional). See generally Note, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960) (discussion of the traditional bases used to justify the im-
position of conditions on governmental berlefits).
197. 374 U.S. at 406. The Sherbert Court declared:
This holding but reaffirms a principle that we announced a decade and a half ago,
namely that no State may 'exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Moham-
medans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members
of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits
of public welfare legislation.'
Id. at 410 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)) (emphasis in original).
The vitality and scope of Sherbert v. Verner was elucidated in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981). Thomas concerned a claim for unemployment compensation made by a
Jehovah's Witness who left his job because he believed it to be contrary to the scriptures to
produce armaments. In reversing the Indiana Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court
held the employee eligible for unemployment benefits. The Court stated that where the state
conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith,
thereby placing substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs, a burden upon religion exists which constitutes an infringement upon free exercise. Id.
at 717-18.
198. See note 85 supra for a discussion of estimates of the cost of complying with § 504 for
the public school system.
199. The burden on an employer under § 504 is to "reasonably accommodate" handicapped
employees. The notion of "reasonable accommodation" includes a consideration of the burden
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coffers that depend on the pockets of the parents of attending children and
on the church that supports the school for replenishment."' Money spent
on such accommodation is necessarily directed away from the schools'
raison d'etre-the furthering of the school's religious mission. 20  Unlike
public schools, church-related schools do not have the privilege of tapping
tax revenues to meet the costs of complying with section 504.202 In fact,
many kinds of general aid to those schools that could lighten the burden of
complying with section 504 by assisting secular instruction have been held
to be impermissible due to the school's religious nature. 2 3 Thus, because of
the funding scheme of church-related schools, the condition placed on
federal financial assistance by section 504 burdens the church-related
schools' ability to carry out their religious missions.
Compliance with section 504 burdens free exercise in another way. As
discussed above, there is the potential for entangling governmental regula-
tion of employment decisions if section 504 is held applicable to church-
related schools.2 0 4 Requiring church-related schools to endure such poten-
tially entangling regulation as a condition of the acceptance of federal
financial assistance would require the schools to sacrifice those free exercise
rights that protect the employment relationships between the schools and
their teachers, 0 5 and possibly between the schools and their other
employees. 20 6
Although the burdens on free exercise rights of church-related schools
discussed above may be more indirect than the burden on free exercise in
Sherbert v. Verner, there is a similarity between Sherbert and the applica-
tion of section 504 to church-related schools that favors exempting church-
related schools from the purview of section 504. The plaintiff, in Sherbert,
was the direct beneficiary of the unemployment compensation benefits that
she sought to receive without having to sacrifice her religious freedom. In
the church-related school context, the students are the direct beneficiaries of
on the employer. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1981). Unfortunately, a meaningful determination as to
undue burden is precluded by the absence of statutory guidelines to assist the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) in assessing the burden on a school.
200. Church-related schools often operate at a deficit. For example, each of the five Indiana
Catholic high schools involved in Catholic Bishop operated at a substantial deficit, which was
met by direct contributions from the parishes in the Diocese. Brief for Respondent at 10 & n.9,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
201. Justice Douglas, concurring in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). noted that
"the raison d'etre of parochial schools is the propagation of a religious faith." Id. at 628. See
also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 503 (1979) (quoting Justice Douglas'
statement in Lemon).
202. The respective financing schemes of public and church-related schools have been ap-
proved as constitutionally sound. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977); Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
203. See note 146 supra.
204. See notes 181-89 and accompanying text supra.
205. See notes 156-89 and accompanying text supra.
206. But see note 189 supra.
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federal assistance in the form of school lunches and remedial reading and
tuition assistance that the church-related schools seek to provide without a
compromise of their religious mission. Therefore, to prohibit such federal
assistance to church-related schools arguably would burden the students'
first amendment free exercise rights to choose a sectarian school. In sum,
the essence of the "conditioning a benefit on a burden" problem is that the
government cannot make the receipt of federal benefits contingent upon the
school's compliance with regulations that require the sacrifice of constitu-
tional freedoms. 0
7
The potential for infringement of first amendment rights arises most
readily with the section 504 ban on discrimination on the basis of handicap
because, unlike the race or sex discrimination proscriptions, compliance
with section 504 may require a substantial outlay of funds. Requiring a
church-related school to expend large sums constitutes a sacrifice of
religious freedom in that the limited funds of the school must be directed
away from the fulfillment of its religious mission if the school hopes to pro-
vide its students with the benefits from what little federal aid is permissible.
In light of this heavy burden attendant on the acceptance of federal
benefits, the application of section 504 to church-related schools may be
deemed unconstitutional." 8 To avoid these serious constitutional questions,
a court should adopt the reasoning of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago"9 and narrowly interpret section 504 as inapplicable to church-
related schools.
Step Two: Examining Section 504 and Its Legislative History for the "Af-
firmative Intention of the Congress Clearly Expressed"
Under Step One, the first amendment problems arising from the applica-
tion of section 504 to church-related schools were discussed. The discussion
of the problems of excessive entanglement and conditioning a benefit on a
burden revealed that the application of section 504 to church-related schools
would give rise to serious constitutional questions. Under NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, this risk of encountering constitutional problems re-
quires the court to identify "the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed" to include church-related schools within the proscription of sec-
tion 504.
207. The court in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 485 F. Supp. 255
(N.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd and rev'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), held that a
seminary did not waive first amendment objections by seeking and accepting veterans who
were receiving veteran's assistance. See notes 169-77 and accompanying text supra. Similarily,
by accepting federal assistance, church-related schools do not consent to infringement of their
religious liberty.
208. See generally Wilcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public
Spending, 41 CORNELL L. REV. 12 (1955) (examination of conditions that are so far removed
from benefits or employment that they could be unconstitutional).
209. 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
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As discussed above, section 504 was drafted in broad terms lacking any
specific definition of the meaning of "program" or "recipient" as used
therein. 2 ' Furthermore, there is no discussion of the application of section
504 to church-related schools in the sparse legislative history of that
section.2 ' Therefore, it cannot be maintained that the "affirmative inten-
tion of the Congress clearly expressed" in drafting section 504 was to in-
clude church-related schools within the scope of section 504.212 Absent such
a congressional intent, the reasoning of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago2 3 supports a narrow construction of section 504 as inapplicable to
church-related schools, and thus avoids any potential constitutional infrac-
tion.
Creating a Religious Exemption Under Section 504:
The Free Exercise-Establishment Clause Tug of War and
the Accommodating Principle of Benevolent Neutrality
If narrowly construed, section 504 would be inapplicable to church-
related schools and first amendment free exercise problems can be avoided.
Exempting church-related schools from section 504, however, gives rise to
another constitutional problem. Specifically, such an exemption arguably
operates in favor of religion in violation of the establishment clause.21 4
Justice Stewart, in his opinion concurring in the result in Sherbert v.
Verner,2 noted that "there are many situations where legitimate claims
under the Free Exercise Clause will run into a head-on collision with . . .
the Establishment Clause." 2 6 Justice Stewart further noted that "[tlhe ob-
vious potentiality of such collision has been studiously ignored by the
Court .. ., " If a religious exemption that is purportedly required by free
exercise concerns constitutes a special privilege, the establishment clause is
thereby violated, and the result is the head-on collision referred to by
Justice Stewart.2 8 The exemption of church-related schools from section
504 would constitute such a special privilege in that public schools and
nonreligious private schools will be compelled to make substantial expend-
itures not required of church:related schools.
210. See notes 5-24 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of § 504 and its legislative
history.
211. See note 101 supra.
212. Contrast § 504 with Title VII, where there was some intention expressed as to the
coverage of religious institutions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l.
213. See notes 104-20 and accompanying text supra.
214. For a discussion of the establishment clause see notes 130-49 and accompanying text
supra.
215. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a discussion of Sherbert see notes 190-97 and accompanying
text supra.
216. 347 U.S. at 414.
217. Id. at 414 n.2.
218. See Note, Marshall v. Pacific Union Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists: Expanding the
Application of Excessive Entanglement, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 345, 370, 372-73 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Excessive Entanglement].
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Since Justice Stewart observed in Sherbert that the Court had ignored the
tension between the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment, the Court has attempted to address the potential for conflict in
a principled manner. In Walz v. Tax Commission,"9 the Court2 ' con-
sidered a constitutional challenge to the exemption from property tax of
real or personal property used exclusively for religious purposes. 2 ' In deter-
mining the validity of the challenge that the tax exemption advanced
religion in violation of the establishment clause,222 the Court considered the
purpose of and the relationship between the free exercise and establishment
clauses. The basic purpose of these provisions, the Court noted, is "to in-
sure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none
inhibited." 2 '3 Short of these constitutionally proscribed governmental acts,
there would appear to be some range of neutral activity in which the
government could constitutionally engage. The notorious internal incon-
sistency of the Court's first amendment opinions has resulted from what the
Court viewed in retrospect as "too sweeping utterances" made in previous
cases regarding the scope of the two religion clauses.224 The Walz Court at-
tempted to establish a zone of "benevolent neutrality that will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference ' 2 5
through a formulation of the "accommodation theory. ' 2 6
219. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). For a discussion of Walz see notes 135-38 and accompanying text
supra.
220. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan wrote a con-
curring opinion; Justice Harlan a separate opinion; and Justice Douglas a dissenting opinion.
221. The property tax exemption also applied to property used for charitable, philanthropic,
educational, hospital, and other purposes. 397 U.S. at 667, n.l.
222. Walz reasoned that, by granting a tax exemption to church property, the New York
Tax Commission indirectly compelled him to contribute to religious bodies in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 667.
223. Id. at 669.
224. Id.
225. Id. See Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax
Credits, 92 HARV. L. REV. 696 (1979). The author of this Note characterized the Court's opin-
on in Walz as a "paradigm of balancing" between separation and neutrality. Id. at 710.
226. 397 U.S. at 669. See P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-79 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as KAUPER]. Professor Kauper defines accommodation theory as:
The theory that any limitations derived from the establishment limitation cannot be
rigidly applied so as to preclude all aid to religion or to require absolute neutrality,
that questions arising under the establishment limitation cannot be viewed in isola-
tion from the free exercise guarantee, and that in some situations government
must, in other situations may, accommodate its policies and laws in the fur-
therance of religious freedom.
Id. at 59 (emphasis in original). Professor Kauper marks Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952), as the first expression of the accommodation theory. KAUPER, supra, at 67. Zorach in-
volved the practice in New York City public schools of permitting students, at the request of
their parents, to leave school buildings and grounds to attend religious instruction at religious
centers, while compelling all other students to remain in their classrooms. In upholding this
practice against free exercise and establishment clause attacks, the Court noted that the prac-
tice involved neither religious instruction in public schools, nor an expenditure of public funds,
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The Walz Court, however, provided little guidance as to exactly how the
accommodation theory should be applied. Thus, it is necessary to look to
the comments of observers and other United States Supreme Court opinions
to develop further the concepts of "benevolent neutrality" and "accom-
modation" as means of resolving first amendment conflicts.
The principle of benevolent neutrality has been characterized by one com-
mentator as a "judicially-created concept [that] . . . balances free exercise
against establishment and is weighted in favor of free exercise." '27 Another
commentator describes the accommodation principle as "the judicial vehicle
for harmonizing the two clauses in the interests of this larger and
benevolent neutrality which in an overall sense is directed to the end of pro-
tecting and advancing religious liberty.""22 Both commentators would limit
the application of the principle of benevolent neutrality at the point of state
"involvement''229 or "entanglement" 30 with religion.
Benevolent neutrality, as a principle of decision, can be seen operating in
the case of Sherbert v. Verner," ' although the Court did not name the prin-
ciple until several years after Sherbert.232 The claimant in Sherbert was
but merely an adjustment of the schedules of these schools. 343 U.S. at 315. The Court
pointed out that to hold that the state may not accommodate the spiritual needs of its people
would be to "find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indif-
ference to religious groups." Id. at 314.
Professor Katz suggests that neutrality, as guaranteed by the first amendment, means that in
some instances, government must aid religion to avoid placing religion at a disadvantage and
thereby limiting the full enjoyment of religious liberty. See Katz, Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 426 (1953). Professor Kauper noted that accommodation
principles recognize the "larger neutrality" posited by Professor Katz. KAUPER, supra, at 71.
See also Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, in
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 27-28 (D. Giannella ed. 1963) (discussing the concept of a
"larger and benevolent neutrality") [hereinafter cited as Studies in Neutrality].
227. Excessive Entanglement, supra note 218, at 373. See also Studies in Neutrality, supra
note 226, at 16.
228. Studies in Neutrality, supra note 226, at 27-28. See also Excessive Entanglement, supra
note 218, at 373 (discussion of accommodation theory and the need for the entanglement test).
229. See Studies in Neutrality, supra note 226, at 28, where Professor Kauper states that
"accommodation of laws and programs in furtherance of religious liberty cannot be carried to
the point where it swallows up the establishment limitation. The accommodation theory is
limited by the involvement principle."
230. See Excessive Entanglement, supra note 218, at 374. The author notes:
The acceptance of benevolent neutrality indicate[s] the Court's intention to allow
the greatest possible area in which free exercise could flourish; at the same time,
the development of the entanglement test indicate[s] the Court's concern that the
involvement allowed under benevolent neutrality would not constitute a violation
under the establishment clause.
The author argued that Marshall v. Pacific Union Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1977), is an application of the concept of benevolent neutrali-
ty through the entanglement test. Excessive Entanglement, supra note 218, at 369-70.
231. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
232. The term "benevolent neutrality" first appeared in a majority opinion in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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granted a special exemption so as to protect her religious liberty.233 In
rejecting the establishment clause claims raised by the granting of a special
exemption, the Court reasoned that the "extension of unemployment
benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects
nothing more than the governmental obligation to neutrality in the face of
religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious
with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause
to forestall.' '234 One commentator interpreted the Sherbert holding as imply-
ing that "in some instances, in spite of the prohibition against establishment,
the free exercise clause requires the legislature to grant a special religious ex-
emption to accommodate the free exercise rights of the individual. ... "I
The establishment clause problem caused by granting a special exemption
from section 504 to church-related schools-an exemption purportedly com-
pelled by the free exercise clause-gives rise to a conflict between the ap-
parent demands of the religion clauses which may be resolved under the
principle of benevolent neutrality. As illustrated in Sherbert,'3" the concept
of benevolent neutrality requires that, in evaluating the exemption of
church-related schools from the section 504 mandate of nondiscrimination
in employment under federally assisted programs, the conflicting establish-
ment and free exercise concerns be weighed and balanced against each
other, with the balance favoring the protection of free exercise. The free ex-
ercise concerns, which purportedly would require an exemption from sec-
tion 504 for church-related schools, are the excessive entanglement and in-
terference of government with the relationship between the church-related
schools and their teachers and other sectarian employees,237 and the imper-
missible conditioning of a benefit on a burden to free exercise rights.238 The
granting of an exemption creates establishment clause problems because this
privilege permits church-related schools to receive federal benefits such as
school lunches and tuition assistance for students without incurring the
substantial expenditures that compliance with section 504 might require.
Weighing the free exercise concerns against the establishment concern re-
quires making a subjective judgment as to the importance and seriousness
of each concern. The free exercise concerns appear substantial in light of
233. 374 U.S. at 409-10. For a discussion of Sherbert see notes 190-97 and accompanying
text supra.
234. 374 U.S. at 409.
235. Excessive Entanglement, supra note 218, at 372-73 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
236. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Widmar v.
Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981). The Widmar Court held that religious groups should have ac-
cess to open forum facilities at a state university. The Court analyzed the problem as one of
content-based regulation of speech. The Court also noted that religious groups possibly will
benefit from access to the university's facilities, implicitly applying the principles of benevolent
neutrality. 102 S. Ct. at 274.
237. See notes 181-89 and accompanying text supra.
238. See notes 190-207 and accompanying text supra.
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the religious mission of church-related schools239 and the importance to that
mission of sectarian control over the choice of who will inculcate religious
values in students of church-related schools. The free exercise concerns gain
further weight in view of the pressure that would be placed on church-
related schools to compromise their religious mission 4 0 to provide their
students with federal tuition assistance and school lunches. In contrast, the
establishment clause concern is made substantially less significant by the
constitutionally mandated limitation on the amount and nature of federal
aid that church-related schools may receive. 2 ' The establishment concern is
further weakened because, in most instances, federal aid directly benefits
the students and only indirectly benefits the schools. 22 Thus, the balance
appears to be best achieved by granting the exemption.
Although the principle of benevolent neutrality arguably would require
that church-related schools be granted an exemption from the section 504
mandate of nondiscrimination in employment under federally assisted pro-
grams, such an exemption results in inequitable treatment of nonreligious
private schools. To minimize this inequity, it is suggested that Congress and
agencies implementing section 504 should redefine "recipient" to exclude
institutions that benefit only indirectly from federal assistance, 4 3 and courts
and implementing agencies should adopt a definition of "program" that re-
quires that the mandate of section 504 apply only to those programs and
activities that are federally assisted.214
239. See note 201 supra.
240. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976),
emphasized "the pernicious tendency of.a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to com-
promise their religious mission without wholly abandoning it. The disease of entanglement may
infect a law discouraging wholesome religious activity as well as a law encouraging the pro-
pagation of a given faith." Id. at 775.
241. See notes 130-49 and accompanying text supra.
242. See notes 102-03 and accompanying text supra.
243. See text accompanying note 88 supra. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (now, Health and Human Resources) has shown some willingness to restrict the defini-
tion of "recipient," but appears to take away with one hand what it gives with the other. In its
Analysis of Final Regulation, HEW states:
One other comment requested that the regulation specify that nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools that are not otherwise recipients do not become recipients
by virtue of the fact their students participate in certain federally funded programs.
The Secretary believes it unnecessary to amend the regulation in this regard,
because almost identical language in the Department's regulations implementing
Title VI and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 has consistently been
interpreted so as not to render such schools recipients. These schools, however, are
indirectly subject to the substantive requirements of this regulation through the ap-
plication of § 84.4(b)(iv), which prohibits recipients from assisting [sic] agencies
that discriminate on the basis of handicap in providing services to the beneficiaries
of the recipients' programs.
45 C.F.R. 84 app. A (1980).
244. See notes 35-56 and accompanying text supra.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Section 504 mandates nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap in
employment "under programs or activities receiving Federal financial
assistance. 2 4' The scope of this mandate was not made clear by the
legislature and is in dispute. The preferred definition of the scope of section
504 is one that would apply section 504 only to those programs or activities
specifically receiving federal assistance. Where an institution or organization
receives this type of federal assistance, but in such large amounts that it
would not be possible to segregate the assisted from the unassisted pro-
grams and activities, all of the employment practices of the recipient should
be subject to section 504.
However, the application of the section 504 nondiscrimination in employ-
ment mandate to church-related schools raises serious constitutional ques-
tions of entanglement and of the conditioning of a benefit on a burden.
Therefore, under the NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago free exercise
analysis, the Act should be examined to determine whether "the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed" '246 was to include church-related
schools. Such an examination reveals no affirmative congressional intent to
include church-related schools within the purview of section 504. Therefore,
section 504 should be narrowly interpreted to exclude church-related schools
from its mandate.
The granting of an exemption from section 504 to church-related schools
to avoid free exercise problems gives rise to an establishment clause prob-
lem. The conflict between the two religion clauses of the first amendment
may be resolved by applying the accommodation principle of benevolent
neutrality. The application of the principle of accommodation to this con-
flict would justify the exemption of church-related schools from the section
504 mandate.
245. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1979).
246. 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
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